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AN ESSAY ON LULU, NIMBY, AND THE PROBLEM 
OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
Denis J. Brion* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Article is to probe two acronyms. It is a 
phenomenon of our times that we eagerly coin acronyms in order to 
explain and explore emerging issues. Although this practice no doubt 
has a variety of functions, coining such labels at least helps to make 
the matter at issue more familiar and less offputting. It almost seems 
as if much of the complexity and intractableness of a pressing prob-
lem can be dissipated simply by labelling it with a colloquialism. By 
giving the problem a "handle," so to speak, we thereby "get a handle 
on it." 
This Article explores what lies behind two currently prominent 
acronyms, lest the pejorative cast that they carry serves too well to 
mask a problem that is endemic precisely because, as I will argue, 
the law has failed to account for values important in our political 
society. A special irony accompanies this failure. Its genesis lies in 
the commendable introduction of social policy analysis into common 
law adjudication. 
The first acronym refers to the source of the problem-LULUs: 
"Locally Unwanted Land Uses." Examples in present day society 
* B.S., Northwestern University, 1961; J.D., University of Virginia, 1970; Visiting Profes-
sor of Law, Boston College Law School. The research for this Article was supported in part 
by the Frances Lewis Law Center of Washington & Lt:e Law School, and by the Institute for 
Environmental Negotiation of the University of Virginia. An earlier version of this Article 
was delivered on October 5, 1984 at the Conference on Siting Locally Unwanted Land Uses 
sponsored by the Institute and published by the Institute. Brion, Private Property and Social 
Property, INSTITUTE FOR ENVT'L NEGOTIATION, NOT-IN-My-BACKYARD!: COMMUNITY RE-
ACTION TO LOCALLY UNWANTED LAND USE 43 (1985). The author would like to express his 
gratitude for the helpful comments of Judith A. McMorrow and James R. Repetti, as well as 
the able research assistance of Mary Deck, Paul Kuhnel, and Catherine Nesser. 
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abound: halfway houses for the mentally handicapped, the formerly 
incarcerated, or the unwed mother; sites for offensive or dangerous 
processes, such as toxic chemical production, nuclear power gener-
ation, or sewage treatment; or disposal facilities for the wastes of 
such processes. 
The second acronym refers to the phenomenon that has turned 
the problem into an intractable political controversy-NIMBY: "Not 
In My Back Yard." We all seem to agree that society needs these 
facilities. We also seem to agree that we, as inrlividuals, want these 
facilities to be located somewhere other than close to our own 
homes. 1 A paradox arises because we also seem to agree that, when 
we use objective, technologically sound criteria to locate a site for 
one of these facilities, we must brand those who will be its near 
neighbors as poor citizens when they cry "NIMBY!" 
This Article attempts to trace the roots of NIMBY to a failure of 
the law. This failure is grounded both in the ultimate weakness of 
procedural norms as a safeguard for our public decisionmaking and 
in inadequate judicial consideration of the full range of societal values 
that ought to determine the definition of, and the constitutional 
protection to be accorded, rights in property. This Article argues 
that the NIMBY acronym carries an unfounded pejorative gloss and 
describes a possible solution to the pressing problems that generate 
the NIMBY phenomenon. 
At stake is not merely the way that we perceive the motivations 
of certain prominent, if episodic, participants in our processes of 
public choice. 2 Rather, we as a political society will continue to fail 
to understand an urgent and fundamental political question-how a 
culture committed to technological progress can define and achieve 
I The cry of NIMBY is, of course, not a phenomenon unique to any particular culture. 
Indeed, it arose with particular intensity over a nuclear power plant to have been constructed 
near Krasnodar, a city in southwest Russia near the Black Sea, forcing its cancellation. See 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1988, at AI, col. 1. 
2 Throughout, this Article will use the term "public choice" to denote that process, now 
inseparably mixed between the public and private sectors, by which we reach the formal 
public decisions of our political society. See, e.g., C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE 
WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 170-213 (1977); Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline 
of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982). 
The term "public choice" is used as well by a school of thought that advances the normative 
proposition that a market-like mode ought to govern such decisionmaking. See, e.g., J. BUCH-
ANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962). As the text accompanying infra notes 30--35 makes clear, this 
Article does not accept that proposition because it ultimately leads to what is in effect a 
property qualification for participation in the political process. 
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the level of integrity that we are to accord to our natural and social 
biotic systems. The historian Alpheus Mason posed a fundamental 
political question, how to maintain heritage and heresy in creative 
tension. 3 Those who cry "NIMBY!" offer a voice that deserves a 
better hearing in the ongoing debate over this fundamental question. 
This Article refers throughout to two principal protagonists in-
volved in a paradigm dispute. On one side of the dispute is Owner, 
seeking to establish a sensitive land use, a L UL U. In our highly 
complex, late capitalist society, Owner could as well be a govern-
mental entity as a private one. On the other side of the dispute is 
the adjacent property owner, Neighbor, whose use is primarily res-
idential rather than industrial or commercial, who sometimes acts 
alone, but who much more often acts as part of a group. Neighbor 
is crying "NIMBY!" because the LULU threatens the considerable 
value that her property represents to her. 
II. THE PUBLIC CHOICE PROCESS 
For years, Boston, like many American cities, has been frustrated 
in finding acceptable methods for disposing of its solid waste. In 
1983, Boston officials decided to locate a solid waste incinerator at a 
site in South Bay close to the moderate incom8 South Boston area 
of the city, with construction to begin by the end of 1987.4 In the 
summer of 1987, the politically powerful president of the Massachu-
setts Senate, whose district includes both South Bay and South 
Boston, secured senate passage of a bill that would block construc-
tion of the incinerator, touching off an acrimonious controversy with 
the politically powerful mayor of Boston, who also is from South 
Boston.5 In September, the Senate President shrewdly proposed that 
the incinerator be located at a site in the suburban community of 
Weston. This site was far superior in terms of such engineering 
criteria as site size, site characteristics, zoning, and transportation 
access. 6 The proposal was politically shrewd because, hardly by co-
incidence, Weston is a highly affluent community. 7 
3 See Mason, To Be More Safe: America's Continuing Dilemma, 45 VA. Q. REV. 545, 553 
(1969). 
4 Boston Globe, July 22, 1987, at 1, col. 4. 
5 See id., July 16,1987, at 1, col. 1; see also id., July 23,1987, at 1, col. 1. 
6 See id., Sept. 17, 1987, at 1, col. 1. 
7 Weston boasts the highest average family income in the Commonwealth. See id., Sept. 
20, 1987, at 33, col. 5. 
440 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:437 
High comedy and low politics were the result. 8 To any casual 
observer with even the most rudimentary political awareness, there 
was no doubt that the Weston proposal was utterly unfeasible,9 and 
this was the point. Due to its affluence, Weston was too important 
a player in the political market not to be able to protect itself. 10 
Indeed, by late December, a third political power, the Governor, 
was well into the process of forging a compromise plan that would 
establish a recycling facility at the South Bay site. 11 
The Weston episode is an example of the rather large gap between 
promise and performance in our political structure of participatory 
democracy. Our political myth12 tells us that our public processes 
are open to all and are responsive to all. Our political experience 
tells us that the decisions that these processes produce can more 
often be explained in terms of a perceived hierarchy of power. Af-
fluent communities do not find themselves bisected by elevated high-
ways or fouled by waste disposal facilities; modest communites do. 
Why do our nominally open processes of public choice respond to so 
narrow a spectrum of the citizenry? 
8 See id. 
[d. 
[M]any people in Weston suspect Bulger [,the Senate president,] is up to something 
other than finding a solution to the trash crisis. 
"Basically, he wants to show voters of Boston and his own constituents that he can 
go screw the rich," said Irmgard Bryant, 57, who lives on Summer Street in Weston, 
less than a half-mile from the proposed site. "It doesn't take more intelligence than 
that of a brain-dead earthworm to see what he's up to .... " 
9 For example, 
[d. 
[o]ne longtime observer of Boston politics, Jack Beatty, the Dorchester-born senior 
editor of The Atlantic Magazine, said he sees Bulger's plan as "an inspired social 
joke. I mean, if you were to back off, if you read this in a novel, and if you knew 
what Weston was and knew what South Boston was, you would laugh and laugh." 
10 As the Boston Globe explained, 
[d. 
Weston is the kind of town that is able to spend $75,000 to hire a nationally renowned 
anti-highway lawyer to fight the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority's plans to add a 
fourth lane to the Pike between Weston and Natick, suggesting it could keep the 
incinerator plans in court for years. 
11 [d., Dec. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 5. 
12 As used in this Article, the term "myth" is not meant to carry a pejorative connotation. 
Rather, it is meant as a necessary process by which we conceptually organize our political life 
at the level of society. That a myth constitutes an ideal that is not realized in practice is less 
important than our having an ideal to which to aspire. Although it does carry a pejorative 
connotation, Roland Barthes's description of mythmaking captures the nature of the idea of 
myth as used here. See R. BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 109 (1972). An extended discussion of 
the American myth is presented in J. ROBERTSON, AMERICAN MYTH, AMERICAN REALITY 
(1980). 
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A. The Limits of Pluralism 
According to the American political myth, our public choice pro-
cesses do not operate in a top-down fashion, imposing an agenda of 
political choices determined by a political and technocratic elite. 13 
Rather, those processes operate in a bottom-up fashion, marshalling 
and implementing the values that people who choose to participate 
bring to the process. 14 The idea of choosing to participate is a sig-
nificant element of the myth.15 In a political society that establishes 
a system of individual liberties and accords strong protection to 
individual rights, a strong element of individual responsibility has 
become an important part of the concept of the autonomous person. 
Thus, participation in political processes is left to individual initia-
tive. If the substantive choices that the process generates do not 
reflect the political desires of the citizenry, then the blame must rest 
with the citizenry for not participating. 16 
Indeed, the term "political market" acts as a ready metaphor for 
our public processesY Just as consumers bring their demands for 
goods and services to the economic market to be met by competing 
producers, the citizenry brings its values to the political market to 
be met by competing producers of political action. With a constitu-
tional structure that establishes only broad constraints on the per-
missible content of political choice, process dominates, and a plural-
ism of values generates the substance of political choice. Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. captured this concept when he spoke of the 
right to free speech as the right to compete in the marketplace of 
ideas. 18 
In practice, the concept of the political market tracking the eco-
nomic market for goods and services is more than a metaphor. Al-
though a strong commitment to the free market forms a substantial 
1:1 The notion of top-down and bottom-up political styles is taken from THOMPSON, To HELL 
WITH THE TURKEYS! A DIATRIBE DIRECTED AT THE PERNICIOUS TREPIDITY OF THE CUR-
RENT INTELLECTUAL DEBATE ON RISK (Univ. of Md. Center for Phil. & Pub. Pol'y, Working 
Paper RC-5, 1983). 
14 ld. 
15 R. BARTHES, supra note 12, at 261. 
16 John Philpot Curran captured the inverse of this notion: "The condition upon which God 
hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance; which condition if he break, servitude is at once 
the consequence of his crime, and the punishment of his guilt." THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
QUOTATIONS 170 (3d ed. 1980). 
17 For a description of the market model of public choice, see generally Michelman, Political 
Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Govern-
ment Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148-57 (1977-78). 
18 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
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part of our political myth, a completely unfettered market would, in 
operation, simply fail to carry out its function of achieving a com-
petitive, and therefore efficient, balancing of supply and demand. 
Thus, government necessarily plays a considerable role in the market 
for goods and services. 19 
For these reasons, the line between the political and economic 
markets is substantially blurred. Because of this blurring, the two 
markets interpenetrate in their operation. A participant in the po-
litical market, for instance, can have as substantial an effect in the 
goods market by participating indirectly through the political market 
as participation in the goods market directly would achieve. 
The interweaving of the two markets is strongly manifest in the 
matter of L UL U s. Sensitive land uses are often part of the private 
processes for producing goods and services. They are just as often 
carried out by government. Even if these LULUs are carried out 
by private entities, government will typically have had a strong hand 
in bringing them about. Government subsidy may be involved. Gov-
ernment permission, through licensing, zoning, or other siting con-
trols, will almost always be involved. 
The principles that underlie government action in a market econ-
omy,20 then, are of considerable relevance to the L UL U problem. 
19 Trade beyond the most rudimentary level would, of course, not be possible without an 
external mechanism protecting the possession by the traders of their goods. Government 
provides that mechanism by instituting and effectuating a system of property rights. Beyond 
that, government intervenes in the market or carries out the role of a market producer in 
order to correct the inevitable failures of a free market, for instance preventing large producers 
from imposing monopoly prices or maintaining barriers to entry, engaging in such activities 
as pollution regulation, in order to prevent producers from creating "external bads," and 
correcting for the under production of "external goods" by engaging in such activities as 
education and road building and maintenance. Moreover, government engages in a broad 
range of activities that generate allocations of resources that are often radically different from 
those that an efficient market would make. Examples include stabilizing the disruptive effects 
of market-driven resource allocation (farm price supports; "bailing out" the Chrysler Corpo-
ration; protective tariffs), integration of rural and urban areas ("postage stamp" utility rates; 
rural electrification), and the imposition of values (attempts to suppress the production and 
marketing of marijuana; encouraging the exploitation of domestic energy sources). See gen-
erally Reich, Of Markets and Myths, COMMENTARY 38 (Feb. 1987) (the choice for organizing 
economic activity is not between the free market and public control, but is based on the mix 
of private activity and public intervention). Finally, the pattern of demand in the market is 
exogenous to the efficiency-seeking function of a smoothly working market. Demand is sen-
sitive to the distribution of wealth among consumers. If government substantially rearranges 
that distribution, then the pattern of demand in the market will likewise be substantially 
affected. For example, the government may rearrange distribution by imposing a progressive 
income tax which tends to narrow the range of distribution, or by financing, say, the Central 
Arizona Project, which affects the geographical pattern of distribution. 
20 This discussion of the standard model of government action and of the nature of its 
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Just as our political myth is based on open participation and a plu-
ralism of values, our notion of government action follows a standard 
model. According to this model,21 there are three principal actors. 
Self-interested and rational consumers seek to maximize their util-
ity.22 Likewise, self-interested and rational producers seek to maxi-
mize their profits. 23 A neutral, well-informed government oversees 
their competition for governmental action. 24 
The reality, of course, is that governmental action departs sub-
stantially from what the standard model envisions. There are three 
causes of this departure. The first is that the standard model is far 
too simplistic in its description of the mechanism of governmental 
action. Second, the structure of government acts as a considerable 
impediment to its ideal function. Finally, the nature of power can 
lead to substantial distortion of the shape of demand in the goods 
and public markets. 
To see why the standard model is far too simplistic, consider first 
that government at all levels is not monolithic. Rather, it consists of 
both vote seekers and bureaucrats. 25 Vote seekers gain office, wholly 
or partly, on the basis of their partisanship. They do not bring a 
neutral stance to their position, nor are they expected to do so. 
Indeed, given the tendency of vote seekers to seek to remain in 
office once they achieve it, they are sure to cater in the most biased 
possible way to the constituency that elected them. 26 
Bureaucrats, on the other hand, tend to be politically neutral. 27 
This does not mean, however, that they are unbiased. It is a recur-
ring phenomenon that bureaucrats exhibit two strong biases-to 
avoid making controversial decisions and to expand their particular 
bureaucratic unit. 28 These biases are thoroughly rational-as mem-
bers of institutions for which a means of measuring institutional 
breakdown is drawn from R. BARTLETT, THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL POWER 
(1973). 




25 [d. at 18-21, 59-64. 
26 Most of what a Member of Congress does amounts to what is euphemistically called 
"constituent service," which in reality is giving specific advantages to individuals in the 
Member's constituency. The Member quickly develops "an obsession with the parochial inter-
ests of his district." Barnes, The Unbearable Lightness of Being a Congressman, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Feb. 15, 1988, at 18. See also Easterbrook, What's Wrong With Congress?, THE 
ATLANTIC, Dec. 1984, at 57, 65. 
27 R. BARTLETT, supra note 20, at 21-22, 70-75. 
28 W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36-42 (1971). 
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performance is not possible, they adopt these biases in order to 
maintain the security of their tenure. 29 
American political pluralism, then, cannot be described accurately 
as a refereed competition between participating consumers and pro-
ducers. Rather, the process resembles more closely a melee among 
four kinds of participants-producers, consumers, vote seekers, and 
bureaucrats-each of whom possesses strong and distinct biases. It 
is a melee because those charged formally with refereeing the com-
petition are themselves biased players. 
The standard model is far too abstract in another way. The justi-
fication for pluralistic democracy is that, with participation open to 
all, any particular individual will participate in particular forums to 
the extent of the intensity of her interest in the issues at hand. In 
theory, any political decision will account accurately for the variety 
and intensity of the positions of the citizenry on the matter at issue. 
Absent bribery, the political market will aggregate the demand for 
political action efficiently. 
Here again, reality diverges from concept. Participation requires 
resources. These resources are of two kinds-those that enable par-
ticipation, and those that provide the substance of the participation. 
Resources of the first kind include time, skills at presentation and 
negotiation, and a sophisticated understanding of the structure and 
operation of, and interrelationships among, the governmental enti-
ties involved in the issue. 
These resources can be developed. They can also be purchased. 
Either way, they are expensive. And herein lies a significant prob-
lem. The high cost of participation leads to the classic collective 
action problem. On a particular issue,30 whether on the basis of one 
person, one vote or on a summation of the intensity of interest, the 
consumers' position on one side of an issue will often strongly out-
weigh, in the aggregate, the position of producers on the other side. 
Yet, the consumers will not participate individually in the process 
because the interest of each is so small relative to the cost of partic-
ipation,31 and because there is no mechanism for them to organize 
their interest. 32 There will, however, be producers for whom the 
29 R. BARTLETT, supra note 20, at 70-72. 
30 It is quite likely that, were a plebiscite to have been held among people reasonably 
informed about the nature of the Central Arizona Project or the Tennessee-Tombigbee Water-
way Project, these massive federal expenditures would have been resoundingly defeated. 
31 R. BARTLETT, supra note 20, at 42-58. 
32 R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION, 38-66 (1982); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 5-65 (rev. ed. 1971). 
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potential gains from a favorable public decision will far outweigh the 
considerable cost of effective participation. Thus, the participation 
that does occur will not reflect accurately the constituency of those 
affected by the issue at hand. Rather, there will be a bias in favor 
of producers leading to a similar bias in the outcome. 33 
Equal in importance to the resources that enable participation are 
the second kind of resources, those that comprise the substance of 
the participation. This substance consists not only of advocacy for a 
particular outcome. In addition, it includes information necessary to 
an informed decision. 
Like nearly every other decisionmaker, public decisionmakers, 
whether vote seekers or bureaucrats, lack full information on the 
issue at hand. 34 A great many public decisions involve information 
that producers possess in abundance, but which government and 
consumers can generate only at high, and often prohibitive, cost. 35 
Vote seekers and bureaucrats thus tend to rely on producers to 
supply this information. 
When government relies, even in part, on producers for informa-
tion, a considerable procedural price is involved. There is a strong 
tendency for the process of communication to fall into an ex parte 
mode,36 to which consumers are peripheral. In addition, this reliance 
can slip into a position of dependence upon the producers, thereby 
risking a psychological identification with their purposes. Perhaps 
most importantly, this reliance makes possible an opportunity for 
producers to supply the information in a biased way, as advocacy 
rather than reportage. Outcomes are thereby biased further. 
The divergence between political myth and political reality has 
other causes. The American legislative model is based on a bicameral 
body with proportional representation. 37 In practice, this structure 
is eminently suited to a logrolling process. 38 Thus, though the basis 
for decision is nominally one member, one vote, in operation the 
process tends to generate measures which carry the intense support 
of a small number of members, though each of the other members 
.33 In 1984, there were an estimated thirty-seven lobbyists for every Member of Congress. 
Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 75. 
34 R. BARTLETT, supra note 20, at 59-79. 
35Id. at 70-79. 
36 See generally Comment, Ex Parte Communications in Local Land Use Decisions, 15 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 181 (1987). 
37 J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 2, at 233. 
38Id. at 233-81; K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 48-51, 108-09 (2d 
ed. 1963) (this is the "Arrow Theorem"). 
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of the body is mildly opposed. 39 As a result, the dominant mode of 
legislative business is an ongoing series of compromises that advance 
the particular interests of individual members.40 Outcomes based on 
a consensus over what best serves the broad public interest are the 
exception. 
This mode of operation further subverts the pluralistic ideal. Be-
cause lobbying generates intense member interest, the process 
places a premium on the ability of constituency members to partic-
ipate. This ability, as we have seen, lies with the producers. Pro-
ducer lobbying generates member interest; the logrolling process 
generates pro-producer outcomes. 41 
The final problem is the nature of consumers' perceived interests, 
the positions that they bring, however ineffectively, to the process. 
Control of resources generates power.42 Having power has the im-
mediate consequence of domination in actions and interrelationships 
involving the powerless. More importantly, having power also en-
ables the power holder to shape the attitudes of the powerless to 
the structure of power.43 Whether through consumer advertising in 
the goods market44 or through participation in public discourse,45 
producers are able to shape consumers' attitudes, and to that extent 
to shape the character of the demand that consumers exhibit in the 
goods and public markets, all against the interests46 of the consumers 
and in favor of the producers' interests. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that our style of public decisionmak-
ing is so strongly at odds with our ideal of a bottom-up political 
system. As Federalist No. 10 indicates, one of the most important 
concerns in the intellectual debate over the form of our political 
39 In effect, individual members of the legislative body participate on particular issues on 
generally the same basis as individual citizens do. 
40 J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 2, at 265-81; Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 
62. 
41 J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 2, at 283-95. 
42 As used in the text, power is meant in this way: "A exercises power over B when A 
affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests." S. LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 34 
(1974). 
43 Id. at 21-25. 
44 C. LINDBLOM, supra note 2, at 214-21; Atlas, Beyond Demographics: How Madison 
Avenue Knows Who You Are and What You Want, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 1984, at 49. 
45 C. LINDBLOM, supra note 2, at 201-13. It is hardly an accident that, for instance, the 
Mobil Oil Corporation runs a prominent and substantial sidebar every Sunday on the second 
page of the editorial and commentary section of the Washington Post. 
46 That is, not the interests induced in B through A's power to shape B's attitudes and 
perceptions, but instead the interests that B would have in a position of autonomy from this 
dimension of A's power. S. LUKES, supra note 42, at 33. 
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structure was the potential for the repression of individual auton-
omy, especially majority oppression of minorities in small commu-
nities. 47 A problem that was only barely anticipated48 has become a 
salient feature of our political landscape, the small group capture of 
government processes at all levels. 
B. LULU Siting and Impasse 
The Boston solid waste problem is hardly unique. The political 
furor over sensitive land uses is the stuff of the daily press. Deep 
controversies arise continually over attempts by private entities to 
find sites for sensitive land uses. Public entities-from the federal 
government attempting to find a disposal site for low level radioac-
tive waste to the municipality seeking to establish a landfill-have 
had little more success than private entities. 
Many state legislatures have attempted to address the problem 
by enacting complex and comprehensive decisionmaking procedures 
for L UL U siting. 49 These enactments attempt to achieve L UL U 
siting while accommodating the interests of those who will be af-
fected by those facilities. These statutes, however, have met with 
little success in achieving their goals. 
The experience under the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facil-
ity Siting Act50 is both typical and instructive. The Massachusetts 
statute applies to facilities handling or disposing of hazardous 
wastes, exempting only radioactive wastes and industrial wastes and 
sewage controlled by federal water pollution statutes. 51 Massachu-
setts state government, facing an endemic problem of illegal hazard-
ous waste dumping,52 secured the passage of the Act in 1980 in order 
to provide a mechanism for encouraging industry to establish facili-
ties that would provide safe treatment and disposal of these wastes. 53 
47 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60-61 (J. Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) [hereinafter THE 
FEDERALIST]. 
48 See id. No. 51, at 335-41. 
49 E.g., Waste Management Act of 1980, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115A.Ol-115A.95 (West 
1987 & Supp. 1988). 
50 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21D, §§ 1-19 (1987) [hereinafter Hazardous Waste Act]. 
51Id. § 2 (definition of "hazardous waste"). 
52 Boston Globe, Jan. 18, 1982, at 15, col. 4; id., May 23, 1982, at 25, col. 1. 
53 Id., July 1, 1984, at 36, col. 3. Under the Act, the Department of Environmental Man-
agement (DEM) solicits proposals for the establishment of hazardous waste treatment facili-
ties. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21D § 3(3) (1987). The Hazardous Waste Facilities Site Safety Council 
(Site Council): reviews these proposals, id. § 4(8); determines whether the proposed project 
is "feasible and deserving of state assistance," id. § 7; encourages the conclusion of a mutually 
acceptable siting agreement, id. §§ 4(9)-4(12), between the developer and the Local Assess-
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To date, there have been five attempts to establish a waste facility 
under the Act, all of which have failed. 54 In each case, the failure 
derived directly or indirectly from strong local opposition. In four of 
the five cases, the opposition came from local citizens. 55 In the fifth 
case, fellow tenants of the industrial park in which the facility would 
have been located objected. 56 
This experience illustrates the substantial problems that bedevil 
our public processes. An effective process for achieving the safe 
disposal of hazardous wastes would almost certainly serve the public 
interest of Massachusetts. Because of their domination of the state 
level political process, however, producers, vote seekers, and bu-
reaucrats determined the substance of the Act. The extent of their 
domination and the nature of their biases are evident in its provi-
sions. As a formal matter, the Act gives no approval power to those 
who would be affected most directly by the adverse impact of a 
hazardous waste facility: the site community and its residents. 57 
Rather, once a developer selects a site and satisfies a state level 
agency that it is qualified to establish and operate the facility 
properly,58 then the only formal issue left is the compensation that 
the developer will give to the community. 59 This issue, however, if 
it becomes contested, is subject to binding arbitration mandated by 
a state agency.60 The overall effect of the Act is to cast the state 
government in the role of advocate on behalf of the site developer. 
The dominant positions of the producers and government at the 
state level political process led to the intensive local opposition that 
ment Committee (LAC); and approves the report required to be submitted by the developer 
on the environmental, social, and economic impact of the project. ld. § 10. The LAC consists 
of local administrative and elected officials and at least three "residents of the area of the city 
or town most immediately affected by the proposed facility." ld. § 5. If the developer and the 
LAC cannot reach· a siting agreement, the Site Council has the power to order binding 
arbitration for the two negotiating parties. ld. §§ 13-15. The host city or town cannot subject 
the facility to any local license or permit process if such a process was not required prior to 
the enactment of this Act. ld. § 16. The DEM can exercise the eminent domain power in 
order to acquire the site on behalf of the developer. ld. § 17. 
54 Boston Globe, Mar. 5, 1985, at 12, col. 1. The facilities were proposed for the towns of 
Freetown, Gardner, Haverill, Taunton, and Warren. ld. 
55 ld., Mar. 7, 1982, at 24, col. 1 (Gardner); id., Jan. 25, 1983, at 68, col. 1 (Haverill); id., 
Mar. 9, 1983, at 17, col. 2 (Freetown); id., Mar. 26, 1983, at 36, col. 3 (Warren). 
56 They "feared the plant's presence would harm their reputations." ld., Jan. 16, 1985, at 
23, col. 4 (Taunton). 
57 Indeed, the Massachusetts legislature explicitly refused to include in the Act the power 
for a host community to disapprove a facility proposal. ld., Apr. 1, 1980, at 19, col. 3. 
58 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21D § 7 (1987). 
591d. § 12. 
60 ld. §§ 13-15. 
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ultimately blocked the five proposed facilities. Local citizens became 
well aware of, and expressed resentment over, the clear pro-devel-
oper bias of the provisions of the Act itself.61 They also became well 
aware of, and expressed resentment over, the considerable bias in 
favor of facility developers shown by state level agencies involved 
in the siting process. 62 Indeed, at one point, in the face of citizen 
hue and cry against facility siting proposals, the Massachusetts Office 
of Environmental Affairs responded not with a consideration of the 
concerns being raised but instead with a $375,000 television adver-
tising campaign extolling the virtues of waste treatment facilities. 63 
Once organized community opposition arose, citizen activists be-
gan to act in the political process with considerable skill. In several 
cases, these activists brought to light instances of site developers 
having less than satisfactory records for waste treatment facility 
operation in other states64 and instances of irregularities in the in-
formation that the developers supplied to Massachusetts agencies, 
matters that the agencies ought to have developed easily them-
selves. 65 In one case, this led the principal state agency, the Site 
Safety Council, to reconsider its prior approval of the developer's 
proposal. 66 
These five imbroglios illustrate the complexity of the public choice 
process. At the state level, the breakdown in the pluralistic model 
is manifest. Throughout the course of events, from the Act's initial 
drafting to the administration of its provisions in specific cases, small 
group capture of state level processes generated a strong pro-pro-
ducer bias. 67 
At the site community level, however, the dynamics are consid-
erably more mixed. 68 To community officials, the principal concerns 
61 Boston Globe, July 1, 1984, at 36, col. 3. 
62 E.g., id., Oct. 12, 1981, at 22, col. 1; id., May 3, 1982, at 11, col. 2; id., June 15, 1984, at 
1, col. 1. In the aftermath of the fight over the facility proposed for Warren, a clergyman who 
had been active in the citizen opposition observed, "There was something morally, inherently 
wrong, about a large company and a powerful state trying to impose their will on us out here 
in Warren." Id., July 1, 1984, at 36, col. 3. 
63 Id., Jan. 7, 1982, at 28, col. 4. 
64 Id., June 26, 1982, at 21, col. 5. 
65 Id., Mar. 8, 1982, at 17, col. 3; id., Dec. 1, 1983, at 79, col. 3. 
66 Id., June 26, 1982, at 21, col. 5. 
67 Id., Aug. 19, 1983, at 19, col. 2; id., Dec. 1, 1983, at 79, col. 3; id., June 15, 1984, at 1, 
col. 1. 
68 For a discussion of the mixed nature of the land development process at the local level, 
in which local government is threatened by capture both by oppressive majorities bent on 
exclusion and by small groups of developers bent on profit maximization, see Ellickson, 
450 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:437 
that a hazardous waste facility raises involve matters of governance. 
These matters include providing police and emergency services to 
the facility and to its neighbors in the case of an accident, the impact 
of the facility on traffic patterns within the community, and the 
control of threats to the general health and safety of the community. 
The public officials, however, will see potential gains as well as 
potential losses. The siting agreement process encourages site de-
velopers to provide substantial funds to offset the facility's impact. 
In addition, the facility will provide increased employment, a com-
modity prized by local elected officials. 69 Finally, a hazardous waste 
facility will often enhance the principal source of local revenue, the 
property tax base. 70 It should not be surprising, then, that, in two 
of the five siting cases, local community officials supported the es-
tablishment of the waste treatment facility. 71 
The neighbors, however, will be at best in a break-even position, 
at worst in a losing position. The siting agreement process does not 
contemplate compensating neighbors as individuals. If this process 
does not internalize the facility's adverse effects, then the neighbors 
will bear its immediate impact: perceptible physical externalities 
such as grit, smoke, dust, or noise; the aesthetic impact of a non-
harmonious facility; and the psychological impact of close proximity 
to a facility that could at any time suffer a catastrophe or, worse, 
that could quietly emanate toxic vectors that are impossible to de-
tect. 72 
Even a siting decision by which the developer commits itself to 
eliminate externalities entirely carries risk. The neighbors must 
decide whether to acquiesce or whether to engage in the considerable 
effort required to make their opposition effective. 73 They face a 
Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 405-08 
(1977). 
69 Boston Globe, Mar. 7, 1982, at 24, col. 1; id., Mar. 9, 1983, at 17, col. 2. 
70 In most cases, the more intensive the use, the greater the market value of the land and 
improvements and, because property taxes are ad valorem, the greater the tax yield. The 
enhancement of the tax base by the conversion of the site to industrial property will usually 
offset the loss to the tax base caused by the partial devaluing of the neighboring property. 
71 [d., Mar. 7, 1982, at 24, col. 1; id., Mar. 9, 1983, at 17, col. 2. 
72 "But how can resistance within a city or town, even if illogical, be overcome. 'Resistance 
comes from the neighborhood where the plant is proposed,' says McGregor [a lawyer with 
considerable experience with the siting process]. 'What must be sought is the approval of the 
community as a whole.'" [d., May 3, 1982, at 11, col. 2. 
73 Typically at the level of local government, and often at the level of state government as 
well, the notion of participatory democracy means no more than holding "public hearings" in 
order to give the citizen the opportunity to present his views before the decisionmaking body. 
There is no requirement that the decision be based in any way on the testimony presented at 
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difficult decision, whether to work now to block the facility in return 
for promises by the site owner as to how it will establish and operate 
the site in the future. The neighbors must decide whether to trust 
the site owner. 
What bases, however, did the Massachusetts site community 
neighbors have for trust? If they had looked to the general perfor-
mance of American industry, they would have found an appalling 
record-the Love Canal dump site in Niagara Falls, N ew York, the 
poisoned water supply in Malden, Massachusetts, the toxic waste 
dump in Times Beach, Missouri, the radioactive leaks from the mis-
maintained and misoperated Three Mile Island nuclear plant sites. 
These disasters are graphic examples of entrepreneurial callousness, 
that is, heedlessness of the effects of dumping hazardous materials, 
dishonesty in revealing known and substantial dangers, and dogged 
resistance to accepting liability. 
The records of the proposed site developers were little better. 
One developer had been accused of poor management of waste fa-
cilities in other states. 74 Two developers had submitted conflicting 
or potentially misleading information to the Massachusetts agen-
cies. 75 The potential industrial neighbors of one developer feared for 
their reputations were it to establish its facility. 76 
If the neighbors had looked to the future, the prospects were not 
promising. They would have a basis for trust only if they knew that 
they would have an expeditious, certain, and effective means to force 
compliance with the siting agreement or of the terms of the Site 
Safety Council approval of the facility proposal. The Hazardous 
Waste Act, however, contains no provision for either private or 
public enforcement of these arrangements through the judicial pro-
cess. To attempt to enforce them through the political process would 
mean advocating before state level entities that had already exhib-
ited effective capture by the site developers. 
What happened, then, in the five attempts to site a hazardous 
waste facility in Massachusetts was all but inevitable. The producers 
these hearings. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21D, §§ 4, 8, 14. Contrast the requirements, for 
instance, for adjudicatory hearings under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, for which 
the administrative record is "the exclusive basis of decision." 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1982). Since 
the citizen has no formal power to contribute to the shape of the decision, the only practical 
use that he can make of his standing is to engage in the political act of organized rhetoric. 
That is, the process gives him only "rhetorical standing." 
74 The Boston Globe, June 26, 1982, at 21, col. 5. 
75 Id., Mar. 8, 1982, at 17, col. 3; id., Dec. 1, 1983, at 79, col. 3. 
76 Id., Jan. 16, 1985, at 23, col. 4. 
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captured the state level political process, procuring a favorable stat-
ute and a hospitable attitude on the part of the agencies of state 
government. The site community citizens, mobilizing at the local 
level, took the only alternative open to them, "rhetorical standing." 
At great cost in time and emotion, and at no small financial cost, 
these citizens won. The public interest, however, lost because, from 
the point when the need for safe hazardous waste disposal arose as 
a political issue, the process no longer focused on the public interest, 
because it was incapable of so doing. 
C. Demoralization 
The experience under the Massachusetts L UL U siting statute 
seems to belie the preceding prediction of frustration and futility for 
general participation in the public choice process. An even more 
telling example might be the environmental movement that began 
in the late 1960s. Both the Massachusetts experience and the more 
general experience of the environmental movement saw the emer-
gence of ad hoc groups of lay people who succeeded in changing the 
kinds of decisions that the public choice process had theretofore been 
making. An important aspect of these experiences was the fact of 
those ad hoc groups. The lesson learned was that the atomistic 
individual could accomplish little in isolation, but could accomplish 
great things when organized into a group. 
Ultimately, however, these experiences illustrate the weakness of 
the pluralistic process. The argument is not that our system cannot 
produce broad consensus. The argument is that such outcomes are 
by far the exception to the typical workings of the process. The 
Massachusetts experience illustrates the simple explanation-it 
takes heroic effort to form and sustain an ad hoc groUp.77 Even more 
important is the nature of the success. In many instances, these 
experiences show ad hoc groups serving generally to induce and 
77 The efforts of the residents who fought the toxic waste facility proposed for Warren, 
Massachusetts serve as an excellent example. The developer for the proposed Warren facility 
was an entity named IT Corp. [d., Sept. 19, 1981, at 13, col. 2. The efforts of the Warren 
residents, the author is pleased to report, included an acronymic name for their ad hoc group-
STOP IT. [d., Oct. 12, 1981, at 1, col. 4. The opposition by the Warren residents is further 
chronicled in id., Jan. 18, 1982, at 15, col. 4; id., Jan. 26, 1982, at 40, col. 5; id., M~r. 12, 
1982, at 22, col. 1; id., Mar. 17, 1982, at 63, col. 4; id., May 3, 1982, at 11, col. 2; id., May 23, 
1982, at 25, col. 1; id., June 20, 1982, at 41, col. 1; id., Jan. 18, 1983, at 23, col. 5; id., Mar. 
26, 1983, at 36, col. 3; id., Aug. 19, 1983; id., Sept. 28, 1983, at 48, col. 5; id., Dec. 1, 1983, 
at 79, col. 3; id., May 31, 1984, at 27, col. 2; id., June 15, 1984, at 1, col. 1; id., June 16, 1984, 
at 19, col. 6; id., June 24, 1984, at 29, col. 2; id., June 28, 1984, at 25, col. 1; id., July 1, 1984, 
at 36, col. 3; id., July 16, 1984, at 17, col. 1. 
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mobilize a general public attitude toward preventing the degradation 
of our important biotic systems and specifically to induce the public 
choice process to adopt regulatory mechanisms for protecting these 
biotic systems. To the extent that these groups have achieved this 
result, they have served the public interest. 78 
More typical, however, is the recent Massachusetts experience. 
One can look on their success as beating the regular participants-
the producers-at their own game. In addition, simply by having 
achieved their goals, these groups will have brought a broader, and 
thus more balanced, range of interests to the public process. The 
fact of having achieved their goals also means that people previously 
marginal to the processes of power will now have experienced a 
measure of empowerment. 79 This must be counted as objectively 
good because it moves the workings of the process closer to the ideal 
of broad participation. 
There is, however, another way to look at these groups' achieve-
ments. When the hue and cry was over, the Act had utterly failed 
to achieve its goal, the safe disposal of hazardous wastes. However 
successful these citizen opponents may have been, they accomplished 
no more than protecting their own particular interests. Despite their 
participation, the process still did not marshall and effectuate the 
interests of the rest of the citizens of Massachusetts. 
Yet, the crisis that generated the adoption of the Act in 1980 
continues. The amount of hazardous waste generated in the state is 
increasing,80 and the consequences of unsafe disposal are becoming 
more strikingly apparent. In the town of Woburn, for example, 
medical experts have linked a leukemia rate eight times the national 
average to a water supply contaminated by industrial waste.81 More-
over, the Massachusetts experience typifies the methods of a large 
proportion of the experience of the environmental movement. The 
principal tactic is delay in every form and forum possible, including 
the judicial forum. Delay can lead to impasse and immediate defeat 
for the developer, as happened in the Massachusetts cases. 82 As 
78 Opinion polls show an enduring and substantial majority in favor of strong governmental 
protection for the environment. If nothing else, this majority opinion shows that these groups 
have wielded the power to shape attitudes of the general public with great effect. 
79 The elation of the Warren, Massachusetts residents over the developer's abandonment of 
the proposed hazardous waste facility is discussed in id., June 28, 1984, at 25, col. 1; id., July 
1, 1984, at 36, col. 3; id., July 16, 1984, at 17, col. 1. 
80 Id., Nov. 17, 1987, at 17, col. 1. 
81 Weisskopf, Did Water Kill Children in Woburn?, Washington Post, Apr. 3, 1986, at A3, 
col. 1; Barr, Poisoned Well, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 17, 1986, at 18. 
82 The developer for the proposed Warren facility withdrew its plans when it faced expenses 
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often, it can succeed only in winning some concessions from the 
developer. 83 
To engage in the tactic of delay in order to assure that factual 
issues are explored adequately and legal issues are considered ma-
turely is entirely proper. 84 To engage in this tactic in order to exhaust 
the opponent is not proper.85 The line between the two is ill-defined 
and permeable. 
The public perception of what our political system does accomplish 
always tends toward the malodorous because what the system pro-
duces best-com promise-is at odds with what our political myth 
says it is supposed to produce-consensus. By experiencing the 
system up close, ad hoc groups have this perception strongly rein-
forced. They may have won at the producers' game. They will sense, 
however, that this is the wrong game. By participating and winning, 
they will be left with a perhaps cynical suspicion that they helped 
to undercut and distort the American political myth. 
III. THE REMEDIAL PROCESS 
We live in a complex world, not least because we have chosen to 
create a complex political world. The traditional interpretation of 
the United States Constitution looks on the powers granted to the 
federal government as an aspect of our sociality,86 our ongoing defi-
of $3.5 million to complete required environmental studies and estimated that it had no more 
than a fifty-fifty chance of successfully withstanding judicial challenges to those studies brought 
by opponents. Boston Globe, June 15, 1984, at 1, col. 1. An executive for the corporate 
developer, in announcing the withdrawal, stated: "No company could be expected to proceed 
with an investment of this obvious magnitude ... and substantiate this as a prudent business 
decision." Id. 
83 A study of mediation as a mechanism for settling environmental disputes is set out in A. 
TALBOT, SETTLING THINGS: SIX CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION (1983). By 
its nature, mediation will give each side something. If Talbot's case studies are typical, the 
fact that mediation is the mode of dispute resolution almost always means that the project 
will go forward in some form without a major change in scope or purpose. 
84 For instance, a Massachusetts citizen group successfully induced its unit of local govern-
ment to challenge the validity of the Hazardous Waste Act. The challenge did not succeed. 
See Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, 392 Mass. 107, 108, 
466 N.E.2d 102, 104 (1984). 
85 The A.B.A. Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides: 
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: 
(1) File a suit,assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other 
action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action 
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another. 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1984); see also STANDARDS OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 80 (N. Redlich ed. 1984). 
86 The terms sociality and individuality are taken from Garet, Communality and Existence: 
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nition and pursuit of goals that express our conception of ourselves 
in common. 87 Under this interpretation, the rights established in 
such provisions as the Bill of Rights are an aspect of our individu-
ality, the way that we define and pursue goals that express a con-
ception of ourselves as unique persons. This standard interpretation 
establishes a dichotomy-it accords strong and non-lexical impor-
tance to individual autonomy and to social power. 
Inevitably, these aspects of our existence come frequently into 
direct conflict. Because neither aspect holds priority, this dichotomy 
prevents the development of general rules to determine these con-
flicts. Thus, the constitutional protection accorded to individual 
rights must be blurred at the edges if the constitutional structure is 
not to be rendered lexical. The individual right to property, then, is 
necessarily indeterminate. 88 The protection accorded to individual 
rights in property is less than absolute,89 and the definition of a 
property right is blurred. 90 
The problem with the law, however, is not the blur at the edges 
that results from the play of incommensurate social values. Rather, 
the problem is that the play of the two competing domains of con-
stitutional values is both haphazard and unpredictable in result, and 
proceeds on an incomplete consideration of the full range of socially 
The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1008, 1012 (1983). Garet argues that to read 
constitutional principles only in terms of sociality and individuality is inadequate because they 
do not provide a complete description of human existence. That description, according to 
Garet, is not complete until "communality" is included. See id. at 1002-03. Garet's concept of 
communality is used to analyze the problem of distributive justice which is the principal 
concern of this Article. See text accompanying infra notes 205--32. 
87 See id. at 1069. "Existence, therefore, gives rise not only to a personal right-the right 
not to be made into a determined thing-but also to a social right-the right to move out of 
the history in which we find ourselves and toward the realization of our common humanity." 
[d. 
88 As stated in the text, the proposition that property rights are indeterminate is meant 
descriptively, as a consequence of the non-lexical nature of constitutional principles. In addi-
tion, however, this Article proceeds on the assumption that this proposition ought to be taken 
normatively as well, on the further assumption that a non-lexical ordering of basic constitu-
tional values is proper. 
89 The very language of the takings clause of the fifth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, 
cl. 5, which forms the basis for strong protection of the individual right to property, itself 
erodes this protection. As the discussion at infra notes 161-91 and accompanying text points 
out, the power of eminent domain amounts to a substantial compromise of individuality for 
the sake of sociality. 
90 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), stands for the proposition that society has the 
legitimate power to prohibit a class of objects from being the subject of a private entitlement. 
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), can be read as saying that 
certain kinds of land simply cannot be held according to the idea of dominion that underlies 
the implicit function of property entitlements protected by the takings clause. 
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prized values. This inadequacy is especially strong when our judicial 
system resolves disputes that arise when one property owner's l,lse 
disrupts the use of another. The law addresses these disputes under 
the rubric of nuisance. 
A. Restatement Nuisance 
As recently as the early twentieth century, nuisance was a variant 
of the law of harms, a strict liability tort. 91 If the plaintiff showed 
that defendant's use of her land caused a harmful physical invasion 
of his land, then plaintiff was entitled to an injunction regardless of 
the care exercised by defendant. 92 Beginning in this century, as 
courts turned more overtly to social policy analysis in settling dis-
putes in the law of harms generally, the law of nuisance also under-
went considerable change. The result was an analytical model, now 
incorporated into the Restatement of Torts,93 that attempts to look 
beyond the contending parties to the social value of the activities of 
both parties and the social consequence of granting a remedy to the 
plaintiff.94 Though the courts have developed and applied this model 
with the best of socially determined intentions, the result has been 
incoherence. 95 
It is useful to review three chestnut cases from nuisance law in 
order to develop a clear conception not only of the nature of this 
incoherence but also of its potential for dis serving the very public 
interest that the introduction of social policy analysis was meant to 
serve. Because these chestnut cases are from different jurisdictions, 
91 E.g., Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913); Arminius 
Chern. Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459 (1912); Bryant v. Lefever, 4 C.P.D. 172 (1878-
79); Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879). 
92 The legal Latin phrase, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your own property in 
such a manner as not to injure that of another), captures the nature of the tort. See BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1238 (5th ed. 1979). The requirements for recovery on a private nuisance 
theory are set out at W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 87, at 622-23 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. KEETON]. 
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822-831 (1982). 
94 The Prosser Hornbook argues that courts use the negligence standard as a means to 
determine whether the remedy is to be an injunction or damages. See W. KEETON, supra 
note 92, § 88A at 630-33. As the following discussion shows, however, courts also use a 
standard of care analysis in order to determine whether there has been a legal wrong. See 
infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text. 
95 See Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979). Epstein argues that much of the current confusion and indeterminacy 
in the law of nuisance could be eliminated by returning to its earlier conception as a strict 
liability tort. See id. at 54-55. Epstein's justification is based on the protection of personal 
freedom and autonomy. See id. at 54. 
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there is the inevitable risk of comparing apples and oranges. The 
risk of producing nothing but fruit salad is offset by the value to be 
gained in exploring the consequences of the departure from the strict 
liability model. 
In the early part of this century, Antonia Bove built a prototypical 
corner store-cum-apartment on the fringe of an industrial area of 
Buffalo. 96 Some nine years later, the Donner-Hanna Coke Corpora-
tion replaced a grove of trees97 across the street from Mrs. Bove 
with what was judicially determined to have been a state of the art 
coke plant. 98 The result for Mrs. Bove was an incessant effusion of 
steam, dust, and grit over her modest property. 99 
The traditional response to the nuisance action that Mrs. Bove 
brought would have been an injunction against the effusions. lOo In 
Eave v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., however, the Appellate Division 
of the N ew York Supreme Court used newly fashionable social policy 
analysis to deny all remedy on the grounds that the coke plant 
contributed substantially to the Buffalo economy,101 that its pro-
cesses were the most advanced available,102 that the company op-
erated the plant as reasonably as possible,103 and that the general 
neighborhood was, and had been, industrial in nature.104 Given that 
the temporal context of the dispute was the early Depression years, 
the way that the court appealed to, and weighed, social policy is 
entirely understandable. 
The standard critique of the opinion is no doubt familiar stuff. The 
court consciously abandoned strict liability by adopting the language 
of "reasonableness." Had the court done this in order to place nuis-
ance into the mainstream of tort, it would have used "reasonable-
ness" in the context of the quality of the defendant's conduct in light 
of the foreseeability of its consequences. 
The court did not, however, return to the mainstream approach 
based on standard of care. The court instead applied reasonableness 
9" Eove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37, 38, 258 N.Y.S. 229, 230 (1932). 
97 See id. at 41, 258 N. Y. S. at 233. 
9" See id. 
99 See id. at 38, 258 N. Y.S. at 230. 
100 For example, in Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913), 
the New York Court of Appeals rejected the notion that a nuisance plaintiff ought to be denied 
an injunction if the advantage to him would be slight and the loss to the defendant manufac-
turer great. 
101 See Donner-Hanna, 236 A.D. at 43, 258 N. Y.S. at 235 (1932). 
102Id. at 41,258 N.Y.S. at 233. 
103 Id. at 38, 41, 258 N. Y.S. at 231, 233. 
104Id. at 41-43,258 N.Y.S. at 233-35. 
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analysis in order to determine how well the Donna-Hanna Coke 
Corporation (Donna-Hanna) went about committing its all too fore-
seeable tort. It would have been enough of a departure if the court 
had shielded the coke company from liability because it had operated 
its processes so as to minimize the damage that it had caused. In 
Donner-Hanna, the court took the further radical step of shielding 
the defendant from liability simply because it operated its processes 
in the most profitable way-the coke company was the rational, 
nonaltruistic economic actor. 
Air pollution remains a pernicious problem. Move the scene for-
ward some thirty years and some 250 miles southeast from Buffalo. 
A similar dispute arises-several residents of an area on the fringe 
of Albany bring a nuisance action against one of the cement plants 
in the Albany region on the grounds that its considerable effusion of 
particulate had harmfully invaded their land. In our second chestnut 
case, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement CO.,105 the New York Court of 
Appeals agreed that the neighbors should have a remedy. 
The court divided, however, over which remedy was appropri-
ate. 106 The majority held that the neighbors were entitled not to a 
decree ordering cessation of the pollutants, but instead to a fair 
measure of damages for the accumulated and anticipated harm 
caused by the emissions. 107 The majority, expressly grounding its 
decision on "channel[ing] private litigation into broad public objec-
tives," reasoned that the cement plant was using the most reasonable 
process available and, like the Buffalo coke plant, the cement plant 
contributed to the economic vitality of the Albany area. 108 The dis-
sent, less convinced that the cement plant was doing all it could to 
reduce its emissions, favored an injunction. 109 
Unlike the Donner-Hanna plaintiff, the Atlantic Cement plaintiffs 
at least obtained a remedy. Nevertheless, the erosion of nuisance as 
a strict liability tort is evident. Whether or not the defendant is to 
be enjoined depends on whether it acted reasonably. Reasonable-
ness, however, is not a matter of foreseeability of harm. Nor is it a 
matter of taking all available steps to avoid an entirely foreseeable 
105 26 N.Y.2d 219,257 N.E.2d 870 (1970). 
106 The principal issue was the matter of remedy-ought the court grant an injunction to 
the plaintiff even though there is a "disparity in economic consequence," that is, when the 
economic loss to the plaintiff is small and the economic value of the nuisance-causing activity 
is great? [d. at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 872. The controlling precedent, Whalen v. Union Bag & 
Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1,6,101 N.E. 805, 806 (1913), had held that an injunction nevertheless 
lay. 
107 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,227-28,257 N.E.2d 870,874-75 (1970). 
108 [d. at 222, 257 N.E.2d at 871. 
109 [d. at 231...,'32, 257 N.E.2d at 877. 
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harm. Rather, it is a matter of taking all steps that might avoid or 
reduce the harm, yet still allow defendant to continue to profit from 
the harm. 
The third chestnut, Spur Industries Inc. v. Del E. Webb Devel-
opment Co., llO involves two substantial Arizona industries-agricul-
ture and retirement communities. In the late 1950s, Spur Industries 
(Spur) established a cattle feedlot in the relatively undeveloped Peo-
ria area west of Phoenix. 111 This exercise in hyperactive caloric 
intake was producing some 500 tons of wet manure daily and, if not 
contented cows, at least generation upon generation of contented 
flies. 112 
The flies and the odor apparently caused little problem, however, 
until Del E. Webb Development Co. (Del Webb) began to construct 
what has become the large retirement community, Sun City, to the 
north of the Spur operation. As Sun City developed toward the 
south, the flies and odor increasingly became a problem. When mat-
ters reached the point that Webb was having difficulty in selling 
more homes, he brought a nuisance action against Spur.1l3 
The Arizona Supreme Court, appealing to the policy of public 
health, ordered that the Spur operation be discontinued at that 
location. 114 The court observed, however, that the feedlot was there 
first and that, in effect, Del Webb "had come to the nuisance."1l5 
Thus, the court also held that Webb must pay a reasonable share of 
Spur's costs of moving or abandoning its feedlot operation. 1l6 
The court offered a perfectly sensible explanation, public health, 
for enjoining the feedlot operation. By granting at the same time, 
however, a damage remedy to the feedlot operator, the court also 
held in effect that Spur's flies owned easements across Sun City 
which Webb was allowed to take by a judicially-granted power of 
eminent domain. 
1. Caprice 
The pattern in which the outcomes of these cases fall raises serious 
questions about the analytical framework itself that underlies pres-
ent day nuisance doctrine. Consider the four opinions that were 
110 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972). 
111Id. at 182, 494 P.2d at 704. 
112Id. at 183, 494 P.2d at 705. 
113Id. at 182--83, 494 P.2d at 704-05. 
114Id. at 184, 494 P.2d at 706. 
115 Id. at 186, 494 P.2d at 706-08. For a discussion of the intuitive appeal and the questionable 
logic of "coming to the nuisance," see Epstein, supra note 95, at 72--73. 
116 Spur, 108 Ariz. at 186, 494 P.2d at 708. 
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rendered in these three cases. Each case involved the same paradig-
matic dispute: neighboring landowners each held an entitlement to 
land that carried a claim for judicial protection from the tortious 
private actions of the other. In each, the defendant engaged in a use 
of land that was, of itself, lawful. Each use, however, caused a 
seriously damaging invasion of the plaintiff's land. Presumptively, 
then, each plaintiff held an entitlement not to be invaded. Because 
of the continuing nature of the invasion, each plaintiff presumptively 
held a claim for judicial protection of that entitlement by a decree 
prohibiting future invasions. 
N ow consider the three cases from the points of view of what was 
at stake and what the courts did about it. At stake in each case was 
an easement-the right for some harmful vector (smoke, dust, par-
ticulate, flies) emanating from the defendant's land to cross the 
plaintiff's land. The plaintiff went into each case presuming that he 
or she held both the entitlement to that easement and a claim for 
the judicial protection of that entitlement. Similarly, the outcome in 
each case amounted to a determination of who held the entitlement 
to that easement and what quality of judicial protection this entitle-
ment ultimately commanded. 117 Counting the two opinions in Atlan-
tic Cement, these courts used Restatement analysis to fashion four 
different outcomes to this single paradigm: 
- According to the Atlantic Cement dissent, plaintiff held the 
entitlement to the pollution 'easement across his airspace, an 
entitlement protected with a Property Rule. 118 That is, plaintiff 
held the right to the security of this entitlement; defendant could 
not divest him of it without his consent. 
- According to the Atlantic Cement majority, plaintiff held 
an entitlement to the pollution easement across his airspace, an 
entitlement protected with a Liability Rule. 119 That is, plaintiff 
was subject to the expropriation of this entitlement by defen-
dant, subject only to the payment of appropriate compensation 
by defendant. 
- According to the Spur court, defendant held an entitlement 
to the pollution easement across plaintiff's land, an entitlement 
protected with a Liability Rule. 120 That is, defendant was subject 
to the expropriation of this entitlement by plaintiff, subject only 
to the payment of appropriate compensation by plaintiff. 
117 This taxonomy of entitlement and quality of protection is that developed in Calabresi & 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
118 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,228-32,257 N.E.2d 870, 875-77 (1970). 
119 Id. at 222-32, 257 N.E.2d at 871-75. 
120 Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178,494 P.2d 700 (1972). 
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- According to the Donner-Hanna court, the defendant held 
an entitlement to the pollution easement across plaintiff's land, 
and entitlement protected with a Property Rule. 121 That is, de-
fendant held the right to the security of this entitlement. Plaintiff 
could not divest defendant of this entitlement without its con-
sent. 
461 
Let us illustrate this caprice, and its apparently endemic nature, 
by one more example. An ancient maxim holds that the property 
owner owns from the center of the earth to the sky.122 For most of 
American judicial history, the courts have applied this maxim by 
refusing to give to a neighbor a prescriptive easement of light and 
view. 123 The judicial logic was a corollary to the idea of nuisance. A, 
by enjoying the view across B's land or by enjoying the sunlight 
coming across B's land to A's land from beyond, does not thereby 
invade B's land. Not having invaded B's land, A can hardly have a 
claim to a right in B's land that has ripened into existence by B's 
long-time tacit acquiescence in A's enjoyment. If A has not harmed 
B, there are no grounds for B to seek redress. Without an invasion, 
there can be no harm; without harm, no statute of limitations can 
begin to run. 
Come now the 1970s with a rapid restructuring of energy prices. 
Solar energy for residences now becomes economically attractive. 
Under the ancient common law maxim, however, B has no right for 
his rooftop solar panels to view the sun across A's land unless he 
purchases an easement from A. 
Despite the "well-settled" nature of this doctrine, yet another 
light and view dispute, Prah v. M aretti, 124 arose recently in Wiscon-
sin when an A undertook to build what apparently was an alto-
gether typical house on a subdivision lot. 125 Unfortunately, the house, 
121 Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37,258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932). 
122 The legal Latin aphorism is, "Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos" 
(He who owns the land owns from the center of the earth to the sky). BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 341 (5th ed. 1979). 
123 The classic case is Parker & Edgarton v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). 
More recent cases include Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 
So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (light) and International Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W. 
Va. 888, 30 S.E.2d 537 (1944) (view). 
m 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982). 
125 Prior to Prail v. Maretti, the Wisconsin courts followed the traditional doctrine that, 
absent an express transfer, a landowner does not have an easement of light and air over 
adjacent land. See Depner v. United States Nat'l Bank, 202 Wis. 405, 232 N.W. 851 (1930). 
Lest the point in the text be misunderstood, it is the genius of the common law that rules 
simply do not decide cases. If rules were binding, then Mr. Prah, once having had explained 
to him the hoary Parker & Edgarton doctrine followed in Depner, would not likely have 
embarked on his action. The genius, then, of the common law is that it is constantly renewing 
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when built, would have shaded the solar panels on B's adjacent 
house. 126 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld an injunction in B's favor 
based on the social policy of energy conservation. 127 Unwittingly or 
not, however, the court thereby transformed the ancient maxim to 
something like, "The owner of the soil owns from the center of the 
earth to the surface of her land, and from the surface of the land to 
the south to the sky." This may be good policy. It makes, however, 
for an awkward rule. 
Worse, B brought his action in nuisance and the Wisconsin courts 
undertook to resolve it within the confines of that doctrine. The 
essence of nuisance, 128 however, is an invasion of B's land generated 
by A's use of his land. But what was the invasion in Prah v. M aretti-
a shadow, that is the absence of light?129 
B. The Inadequacy of Nuisance Doctrine 
The common law is as much process as it is substance. Thus, to 
find that the outcomes of a particular kind of dispute fall into what 
appears on the surface to be a capricious pattern is not necessarily 
a telling criticism. Restatement nuisance represents a conscious ap-
peal to social policy. Thus, if a deeper analysis reveals that these 
outcomes are grounded in a coherent appeal to social policy, then 
their surface inconsistency can be explained simply on the basis that 
the results of such an appeal are strongly sensitive to the necessary 
variety of the contexts of the particular disputes. 
itself, paradigmatically in response to plaintiffs who, having had the law explained to them, 
conclude that it just isn't just, and then set off, bless their cantankerous hearts, to create 
landmark rulings. The problem at the edges of this genius, however, is the all too human 
tendency to fall into the error of making the implicit and untested assumption that renewal 
and change inevitably equate to progress. Yes, we want always to hold open the possibility 
of success to every Mr. Prah who storms the courthouse doors. No, we do not want always 
to accede to their demands. 
126 Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 224-26, 321 N.W.2d at 184. 
127 See id. at 235-36,321 N.W.2d at 189. 
128 Of course, there was a time when one could say, "The essence of nuisance is a strict 
liability tort." See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
129 An activity that courts routinely hold to be a nuisance is the funeral home in a residential 
area, even though it causes no tangible invasion, such as smoke, noise, dust, or light. See, 
Brown v. Arbuckle, 88 Cal. App. 2d 258, 198 P.2d 550 (1948), and extensive citations therein. 
Epstein argues that, because of the absence of a tangible invasion, the funeral home nuisance 
falls outside the dominant nuisance paradigm and ought not to be extended. Epstein, supra 
note 95, at 64-65. 
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Alas, this deeper analysis reveals nothing more than incoherence 
at another level. Take first the solar cell case, Prah v. Maretti. 130 
The Wisconsin court attempted to ground its decision on the social 
policy of encouraging solar energy in an era of energy shortages. 
But was this policy served? The dispute involved two parties in 
conflict over who should hold the entitlement to an easement for 
light across the Marettis' land. The court concluded that the general 
public welfare would be better served were the Prahs to hold it. The 
court did not, however, explain exactly why it should order the 
transfer. 
The Coase Theorem tells us that, in the absence of transaction 
costs, these neighboring landowners whose uses conflict will engage 
in mutual trade that will allocate the two parcels to the most efficient 
combination of uses, regardless of whether the law assigns liability 
to the Marettis or not. 131 If the court believed that, even in this 
simple two-party situation, there would be barriers to fair bargain-
ing, then it could have created a judicial power of eminent domain 
in favor of the Prahs simply by enjoining the Marettis as they did 
and also by ordering the Prahs to pay appropriate compensation to 
the Marettis. 132 Even with compensation thus paid to the Marettis, 
this would involve a substantial erosion of the Marettis' entitle-
ment. 133 
Because the court did not order compensation for the Marettis, it 
may have believed not that there were transactional barriers to 
mutual trade between the two parties, but instead that the price 
that the Prahs would have had to pay would render the total cost of 
130 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982), parsed supra notes 124-28 and accompanying 
text. 
131 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). See infra note 135. 
132 This outcome would be quite similar to the outcome in Atlantic Cement, discussed supra 
notes 105-09 and accompanying text. Like the cement company, the Prahs would get their 
easement across neighboring land; they would, however, have to pay for the easement. For 
a legislative form of this solution, the private right to condemn an easement of view, see the 
Iowa Solar Energy Access Act of 1981, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 564A.1-564A.9 (West 1985). 
The famous Cedar Rust Case, Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), involves, in the context 
of a claim of a regulatory taking, the judicial ratification of a transfer of an entitlement from 
one party to another in circumstances in which the problem involved barriers to mutual trade 
and in which the less expropriative device of a private power of eminent domain would also 
have solved the problem. 
133 This erosion has two aspects. First, the outcome subjects to a private power of eminent 
domain the security of tenure that presumptively is a strong attribute to an entitlement to 
land. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 162-79. Second, because of 
the nature of litigation, a damages remedy falls far short of effective compensation. For 
further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 202-10. 
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their solar cells uneconomical. In effect, this would amount to a 
decision that the public interest would be served by a subsidy to 
individuals using solar cells. The problem is that the subsidy is 
coming not from the public treasury but instead from the Marettis. 
Because the two parties were subdivision neighbors and thus were 
in similar social and economic circumstances, there seems to be no 
overt basis for preferring one party over the other. The decision of 
the Wisconsin court amounts to a naked, uncompensated expropri-
ation. 
Eove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp. 134 involved a substantially dif-
ferent dispute. Here was the classic nuisance-an entrepreneur's 
use caused a tangible and harmful invasion of the land of a private 
individual of modest means. The court in Prah v. Maretti treated 
the entitlement to the easement across the Maretti parcel as com-
pletely contingent on social policy. If the notion of protection for 
privately held entitlements to property is not to be completely con-
tingent, then the starting point in analyzing a nuisance case should 
instead be the presumptive autonomy with which the parties to the 
dispute are to hold their entitlements. 135 
The Donner-Hanna court concluded that the defendant's operation 
was reasonable. 136 Although the court did not offer a further expla-
nation, the effect was that it was reasonable for the coke plant to 
pass part of the costs of its operation onto the plaintiff. If the 
underlying meaning that the court ascribed to the term "reasonable" 
was "most profitable," then the coke company's profit was false in 
134 236 A.D. 37, 258 N. Y.S. 229 (1932), parsed supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text. 
135 One way of approaching the analysis of nuisance disputes is to say that, from an economic 
point of view, the harm is caused as much by Mrs. Bove's use being inconsistent with the 
presence of the coke plant as it is by the coke plant being inconsistent with the presence of 
Mrs. Bove's store and residence. The Coase Theorem tells us that, in tHe absence of transaction 
costs, neighboring landowners whose uses conflict will engage in mutual trade that will allocate 
the two parcels to the most efficient combination of uses regardless of whether the law assigns 
liability to the Marettis or not. Coase, supra note 131. Thus, it can be argued that there is 
no point to entertaining nuisance actions on the part of the Mrs. Boves of this world in 
circumstances in which there will be no transactional barriers to that mutual trade. The 
problem with such an analysis is that, while the assignment of a liability rule is irrelevant (in 
the circumstances of no transaction costs) to allocational efficiency, it is quite relevant to the 
individual wealth positions of the two parties. Moreover, it is relevant to the concern of society 
generally over disparities in wealth distribution. Richard Epstein rebuts the argument in this 
way: "The weakness of the position is its failure to recognize that for legal purposes the 
question of causation can be resolved only after there is an acceptance of some initial distri-
bution of rights." Epstein, supra note 95, at 58. Epstein analyzes this problem of "causal 
nihilism" in id. at 57-60. 
136 For a discussion and critique of the court's concept of reasonableness, see supra note 
103 and accompanying text. 
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that it did not account for part of its costs. The economist's label for 
this situation is a misallocation of resources. 
As troublesome as the allocational consequences of the decision is 
the implicit assumption that the traditional nuisance remedy, an 
injunction in plaintiff's favor, would dis serve the public interest 
because it would shut down a significant employer during an eco-
nomic depression. The court implicitly assumed that Mrs. Bove, 
armed with an injunction, would inevitably exercise the power to 
act as a hold by demanding an unconscionable price in return for a 
covenant in favor of the coke company not to enforce her injunction. 
Take the more plausible assumption, that the two parties, Donner-
Hanna and Mrs. Bove, would have bargained fairly had the court 
enjoined the coke plant operation. 137 In such circumstances, Donner-
Hanna would have chosen the cheapest of three alternatives-pay 
Mrs. Bove the value of her (fair) perception of the harm that she is 
suffering, take effective pollution abatement measures, or shut down 
its operations at that site. Stated in simple Coase Theorem terms, 
because there are no significant transaction costs, the two parties 
will trade entitlements to the extent necessary for them to engage 
in whatever combination of coke production and retail and residential 
uses of the two sites that will be the most efficient. 138 
The Donner-Hanna court may have implicitly assumed instead 
that the coke company would not have remained financially viable 
even if it were required to pay only fair, rather than holdout, com-
pensation to Mrs. Bove and any other potential nuisance plaintiffs 
who may have come forward in the aftermath of a successful action 
on her part. Surely there was an element of public benefit in seeking 
to keep the coke plant operating in Depression Era Buffalo. 139 The 
justification, however, for keeping the coke plant operating has to 
do not with productive efficiency but instead with mitigating the 
impact of the operation of the market. A smoothly functioning mar-
ket is a marvelous mechanism for reallocating resources to their 
most efficient uses. The more effectively the market does this in 
dynamic circumstances, however, the greater the instability. The 
effects of this instability fall heavily on workers who may be tied for 
non-economic reasons to a particular locality, who may not easily be 
137 "Fairness" is used in the sense of bargaining without overreaching. 
138 See Coase, supra note 13I. 
139 For a discussion of the immediate impact and long-term social, economic, and psycholog-
ical effects of plant closings, seeB. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE DE INDUSTRIALIZATION 
OF AMERICA: PLANT CLOSINGS, COMMUNITY ABANDONMENT, AND THE DISMANTLING OF 
BASIC INDUSTRY 25-81 (1982). 
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retrainable, or who, during a depression, will have no other work 
available. Thus, the policy of stabilization provides a justification for 
society to prevent a reallocation, even though to do so frustrates the 
market in achieving efficiency. 140 
Nevertheless, whether to take stabilization measures is very much 
an open question. A considerable and growing literature argues that 
the policy of stabilizing the operation of the market is a response 
that achieves only short-term and local benefits while risking the 
viability of the general economy in the long-term. 141 Thus, whether 
any particular situation is one in which society should choose stabi-
lization over efficiency is a question not easily resolvable in the 
context of a nuisance action. The parties to a private nuisance action 
have neither the expertise nor the incentive to bring before the fact 
finder the relevant evidence and testimony on this issue presented 
from society's viewpoint. Nor is the litigation process well suited to 
making findings on what amounts to questions of national political 
choice. A court is simply not a mechanism for marshalling the de-
mand for political action. 
Even if, however, the particular case is one in which the balance 
between the short-term and long-term effects of exempting the nuis-
ance-causing entrepreneur from bearing his full costs yields a net 
public benefit, this benefit does not come without cost. The coke 
plant emissions devalued substantially what must have been Mrs. 
Bove's principal worldly asset. This cost was borne not by the ben-
140 A present-day example of the stabilization function is the recent bailout of the Chrysler 
Corporation. As another example, stabilization underlies much of the justification for the 
considerable system of agricultural price supports. The Chrysler bailout was intended, and 
turned out to be, a temporary measure. The rationale for agricultural price supports is to 
smooth out the effects of substantial fluctuations in weather from year to year which would 
otherwise engender a continual entry and exit of farmers from agricultural enterprise. 
141 See generally J. JACOBS, CITIES AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: PRINCIPLES OF Eco-
NOMIC LIFE (1984). For general arguments that inflexibility in resource allocation lies at the 
source of the current American economic decline, see B. KLEIN, DYNAMIC ECONOMICS (1977); 
M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION AND 
SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982); R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER (1983); L. THUROW, 
THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE 
(1980). This decline appears to have arisen in considerable part from the problem that the 
response of a well functioning market to dynamic circumstances is the disruption and instability 
of the allocation to production of such factors as capital and labor. One response is to slow the 
reallocative operation of the market. A second is to compensate those, especially workers, 
who are disrupted from the impact of the disruption. Since most of us, whether as investors 
or as workers, are risk averse, we prefer stability to instability. See, e.g., Glaberson, An 
Uneasy Alliance in Smokestack U.S.A., N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1988, at F3, col. 2 (a tradeoff 
of lower pay for job security for labor). The cited literature argues that we have adopted the 
first response excessively. This Article advocates pursuing the second response when LULUs 
are involved. See infra notes 263-76 and accompanying text. 
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eficiary, the public, but by a single individual. The effect of using 
social policy analysis in this manner is to separate Mrs. Bove from 
society and treat her as being in an adversarial relationship with 
society. 142 Yet, it is the entrepreneur, Donner-Hanna Coke Corpo-
ration, that is the adversary of society when it attempts to profit at 
the expense both of isolated individuals and of society by shifting 
part of its costs to others. 
Our constitutional principles value individual autonomy highly by 
establishing a strong system of liberties. Societally sanctioned ac-
tions that tend to expropriate the principal wealth of the modest 
individual, however, undercut individual autonomy. It means little 
in a practical sense for a person to be entitled to a system of liberties 
if he does not also have the means to enjoy liberty.143 For the 
judiciary to ratify the entrepreneurial choice of the coke plant despite 
its negative externalities does not answer the public interest ques-
tion until the distributional consequences have been analyzed. 
By refusing to grant full compensation to Mrs. Bove, the court 
muddled badly the question of distribution. The effect is to provide 
an implicit double subsidy. The first is from Mrs. Bove to the coke 
plant, one that is made without an explicit analysis of whether the 
plant ought to be subsidized. Even if the entrepreneur ought to 
receive a subsidy on grounds of broad social policy, to leave the harm 
where it falls amounts to an implicit subsidy from Mrs. Bove to the 
public generally. 
It is difficult to see how such a subsidy can be justified. Nuisance 
defendants, because they often are entrepreneurs, tend to be risk 
takers and thereby tend to be affluent. Nuisance plaintiffs, because 
they tend to be among the more passive members of society, thus 
tend to be more risk averse and thereby tend to be less affluent.144 
To the extent that these tendencies hold, the implicit subsidies that 
nuisance doctrine generates function as a pernicious transfer from 
the poor to the rich. 
Because the dispute in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement CO.145 did not 
arise in the context of difficult economic conditions, the benefits of a 
142 Frank Michelman makes this point in his analysis of judicial decisions which deny claims 
of a regulatory taking because the social benefit (read: to the rest of society) of the govern-
mental action outweighs the private cost (to one member of that same society). Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compen-
sation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1194-95 (1967). 
143 See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 204-05 (1971). 
144 See infra note 200 and accompanying text. 
145 26 N.Y.2d 219,257 N.E.2d 870 (1970), parsed at supra notes 105-09 and accompanying 
text. 
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policy of protecting the cement plant investment are even less evi-
dent. Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals gave consid-
erable weight to the magnitude of the cement plant investment and 
its economic benefit to its locality. 146 Unlike the outcome in Donner-
Hanna, however, the plaintiffs in Atlantic Cement did get a damage 
award. The effect of the decision was to allow the defendants to take 
an easement for their pollutants by purchasing it, through the dam-
ages payment, from the plaintiffs. Because the plaintiffs could not 
refuse the payment and thereby prevent the easement from arising, 
the outcome of the case can be described accurately as the grant of 
a private power of eminent domain to the defendant to take the 
easement. 147 
Even the damage remedy that the plaintiffs did receive, however, 
is fraught with conceptual problems. One can look at the two possible 
remedies, damages and injunction, as polar opposites. The injunction 
is one extreme-it allows the plaintiff to act as a holdout. In theory, 
the highest rational148 bid of a defendant in the position of the cement 
company is just one dollar less than the least of three alternatives-
the discounted present value of the operation, the cost of moving or 
shutting down, or the discounted present value of the capital and 
operating costs of pollution abatement equipment. 
Under the damage remedy, the tactical positions are reversed. In 
order to recover, the plaintiff has the burdens both of coming forward 
and of persuasion. The proof process comes down to a battle of the 
experts, with the advantage lying with the defendant, given its 
superior knowledge of the financial and technological aspects of its 
operations, its superior access to experts, and the evidentiary bur-
dens on the plaintiff. And, because the evidentiary process is adver-
146 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,225 n. *,257 N.E.2d 870,873 n. * 
(1970). The courts below also picked up on the theme of the side benefits that the cement 
plant generated. The trial court observed that the company had "expended more than 
$40,000,000 in the erection of one of the largest and most modem cement plants in the world" 
and spoke approvingly of the "defendant's immense investment in the Hudson River Valley, 
its contribution to the Capital District's economy and its immediate help to the education of 
the children in the Town of Coeymans through the payment of substantial sums in school 
property taxes." Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 55 Misc.2d 1023, 1025, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112, 
113-14 (Sup. Ct. 1967). The Appellate Division echoed these observations. See Boomer v. 
Atlantic Cement Co., 30 A.D.2d 480,481,294 N.Y.S.2d 452,453 (1968). See generally Com-
ment, Involuntary Sale Damages in Permanent Nuisance Cases: A Bigger Bang From 
Boomer, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 61 (1986). 
147 The property law term is "easement in invitum." 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW 
OF REAL PROPERTY § 412 (1987). The dissenting judge expressly recognized this. Boomer, 26 
N. Y.2d at 229...,30, 257 N.E.2d at 876-77 (1970). 
148 In most cases, emotion will cut the bidding off long before this point. 
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sarial, recovery for subjective harm, such as sentimental value, 
however much it exists in good faith, is a matter of chance. 149 In 
practice, the damages remedy is hollow. 150 Because it is hollow, the 
effect of the Atlantic Cement decision is to establish a subsidy to 
the entrepreneur of the same nature as, though smaller in magnitude 
than, the subsidy that the Donner-Hanna court established. 
The decision in Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb. Development 
CO.151 is similarly puzzling analytically. In Spur, the Arizona Su-
preme Court enjoined the nuisance, but then took the unusual step 
of granting damages to the defendant. The Spur opinion, however, 
does not explain successfully the basis for granting this damage 
remedy. 
As a matter of reasoning within the standard rules of the law of 
harms, the explanation that the court did offer-"coming to the 
nuisance"152-simply did violence to its own statement of the facts. 
Retirement communities, though not Del Webb's, had come to the 
area before Spur began operations. 153 This explanation also did vio-
lence to the law of prescription. In Arizona, the prescriptive period 
is ten years. 154 Spur's flies began to invade what became the southern 
part of Sun City only seven years before Webb encountered sales 
resistance to the affected lots. 155 
The court offered no policy justification for departing from the law 
of prescription. This body of law in fact provides a thoroughly ade-
quate framework for analysing the issue of coming to the nuisance. 
Nuisance generally, and Spur's activities specifically, involve an in-
vasion of another's land. For the court to say that Spur's operation 
somehow stamped a certain character on the surrounding land is to 
149 The various elements of subjective value are discussed infra notes 162-88 and accom-
panying text. A discussion of the probability of recovering subjective value in an action tried 
to a jury is contained at infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. 
150 This is not to say that the plaintiff will never get a substantial recovery. In the sequel 
to the New York Court of Appeals decision in Atlantic Cement, at least one of the plaintiffs 
did extremely well, receiving permanent damages of $175,000 for harm to his dairy farm, an 
amount which reflected a sixty-six percent decrease from its pre-nuisance value. Boomer v. 
Atlantic Cement Co., 72 Misc.2d 834,340 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1972). The named plaintiff, 
Oscar Boomer, asked, in the wake of the New York Court of Appeals opinion, for damages of 
$350,000 and settled for an unreported amount, all for damage to what can most charitably 
be called a junk yard. Id. at 836, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 98, 100. 
151 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972). 
152Id. at 184-86, 494 P.2d at 706-0S. 
153Id. at 181-82, 494 P.2d at 703-04. 
154 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-526 (1982). 
155 Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 182-83,494 P.2d 700,704-05 
(1972). 
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make one of two assertions. First, the court might assert that Spur's 
entomological and olfactory invasion of that land had continued for 
a long enough period-the prescriptive period-that the owner, 
whether Del Webb or his predecessor, was now estopped by the 
statute of limitations that the prescriptive period represents from 
seeking a remedy. The Spur facts, however, cannot support such an 
assertion. 
Alternatively, however, the court might want to assert that policy 
reasons require a departure from the strict requirements of pre-
scription. In order to produce a complete analysis, it would be nec-
essary for the court to offer two kinds of support. One is a statement 
of these policy reasons. The second is an analysis of which require-
ments of prescription are to be relaxed. 
As to which requirements of prescription are to be relaxed, an 
obvious one is the length of the prescriptive period. A less obvious, 
but no less important, requirement is the matter of harm. Surely 
Spur cannot be conceived as having cut off the use rights of neigh-
boring landowners from the moment that it began its feedlot. But 
when were those rights cut off? To say that these rights were cut 
off at the end of a period shorter than the statutory period is to 
make a policy determination about the length of the period. But 
there is another, and distinct, question-when did the period begin? 
To begin a period of limitation means that a harm was inflicted. As 
a legal matter, did Spur's harm begin when its flies began to invade 
neighboring land that was scrubland, range, or irrigation agricultural 
land, even though that invasion caused no damage to those uses? Or 
did Spur's harm begin when its flies began to disrupt a use, in this 
case by preventing the conversion of the land to residential use?156 
As to the policy reasons, the Spur court offered none. One justi-
fication was available in concept, although it may not have applied 
especially crisply in the actual case-the redistribution of part of the 
exchange value that developers tend to capture almost in its entirety 
when exurban land is bought and redeveloped to urban uses. 157 Nor 
could the court rely on an implicit "deep pocket" policy. That ap-
proach to the law of harms tends to shift the cost of accidents to 
certain successful defendants whose entrepreneurial activities fac-
156 For a case involving just this issue, and a more express judicial failure to come fully to 
grips with it, see Hunt Land Holding Co. v. Schramm, 121 So. 2d 697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1960). 
157 For an illustration of the bias toward the risk taker that judicial doctrine exhibits when 
land is converted to a more intensive use, see J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Northgate Mall, Inc., 
404 So. 2d 896 (La. 1981). 
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tually, though not legally, cause harm. The general justification is to 
provide a measure of broad social insurance, the premiums for which 
amount to a redistribution of wealth from the more affluent to the 
less affluent. 
Spur, however, amounts to an attempt to shift the cost of harms 
not from the victim to a relatively more affluent harm causer who 
has not violated the formally applicable standard of care, but instead 
to the victim who has been harmed by a harm causer who has 
violated the applicable standard of care. Moreover, the shift is not 
really to Del Webb's ample pocket. To the extent possible, Webb 
will shift this cost to his customers.158 As elderly persons with fixed 
means, however affluent they might be relative to the general pop-
ulation,159 they are possessed of pockets the size of which does not 
make them as little deserving of our sympathy as are Del Webb's. 
Such a bizarre result, then, would seem to require at least some 
explicit justification. 
What emerges from these four cases amounts to a paradigm of 
nuisance analysis. Under this paradigm, a plaintiff, harmed by the 
invasions from a neighboring land use, asks the court for a remedy. 
The court, in response to this remedial question, analyzes it in terms 
of whether the allocation of resources that the defendant's invasion-
causing use represents serves the public interest. In concluding that 
the public interest is served, the judicial analysis falls substantially 
short of thoroughness, in no small part because a civil action is ill 
suited to such an analysis. In addition, by granting at most a damage 
remedy, the court in effect allows the defendant to expropriate a 
substantial part of the plaintiff's wealth, an expropriation that tends 
to exacerbate the inequality in wealth distribution that prevails in 
society. 
1. The Nature of Neighbor's Loss 
Nuisance doctrine fails because the remedial system answers the 
LULU neighbor's claim for redress by exploring a different question. 
Neighbor asks for a correction of the L UL U's distributional effects. 
The remedial system explores whether the L UL U represents a 
proper allocation of resources. 
Let us look more closely at the natme of the loss that Neighbor 
suffers from the establishment of a L UL U. As a context for this 
158 For a discussion, in the context of zoning exactions, of the ultimate limits on the possibility 
of a complete shift to customers, see Ellickson, supra note 68, at 399-400. 
159 Fairlie, Talkin' 'Bout My Generation, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 28, 1988, at 19. 
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closer look, assume that Neighbor cannot avoid its presence--she is 
sufficiently powerless in the political process and the judiciary will 
not enjoin it. At most, the judiciary will give her an opportunity to 
prove the value of the harm that the L UL U will cause and grant 
her damages on that basis. 
This raises two questions. What are the elements of the harm that 
she has suffered? What is the likelihood that she will recover, 
through the litigation process, the monetary value of that harm? 
Bedeviling the attempt to answer these questions is the fact that 
limiting Neighbor to a damage remedy converts her nuisance action 
to a process for determining the value of a "nuisance easement" that 
the court will create in favor of the L UL U owner. The best mech-
anism for determining a value for an interest in land is the market. 
Market value, however, is generated by trade. Trade, in turn, de-
pends on the meeting of the minds of a willing buyer and a willing 
seller. 
The problem with the nuisance easement is that there is no trade, 
only a forced transfer between an inadvertent buyer and an unwilling 
seller. Neighbor must establish a price for the easement by quanti-
fying the harm that the L UL U will cause to her property interest. 
Certainly there will be tangible elements to this measure of harm, 
such as avoidance costs160 and mitigation costS. 161 Since these steps 
will not put her in her pre-nuisance position, however, they will fall 
short of quantifying the full measure of the harm. In attempting to 
establish this amount, Neighbor can ultimately offer only her opinion 
and the opinions of whatever experts she is able to sponsor. In effect, 
Neighbor must assert a subjective value for this harm. 
a. Elements of Value 
That the value of this harm is subjective does not mean that it is 
ephemeral. It is both tangible and complex. The first element of this 
subjective value derives from the traditional "bundle of sticks" con-
cept of property rights. This concept is based on the notion that the 
owner holds an almost complete dominion over his land. 162 This 
160 For example, if her residence has a cement plant for a neighbor, she might find it 
necessary to install a sophisticated climate control system in her home. 
161 In the same circumstances, she might find it necessary to repaint her house more 
frequently. 
162 William Blackstone defined property as "that sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of 
any other individual in the universe." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF 
ENGLAND 2 (9th ed. 1783). 
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dominion empowers the owner to subdivide this interest almost 
without limit in a considerable variety of ways 163-temporally, 164 
spatially,165 functionally,166 or by commonality.167 This dominion fur-
ther empowers the owner to hold, transfer, recombine, utilize, and 
enjoy this variety of subdividable sticks as he sees fit. 
Property as dominion is subject in concept to only two limitations. 
The state holds the power to expropriate his entitlement in full or 
in part.168 And, his use of his land must not interfere with the use 
and enjoyment of the entitlements of others.169 Dominion is effec-: 
tuated through the security of tenure. Owner's possession and use 
are protected against physical trespasses by and harmful invasions 
from others.17o Owner's title is protected from expropriation by any-
one except the state.17l 
The nuisance easement represents a substantial erosion of Neigh-
bor's dominion. In terms of the use and enjoyment of the invaded 
land, the easements that were at stake in the three chestnut cases 
mattered very much to Antonia Bove, Oscar Boomer, and the po-
tential residents of the southern portion of Sun City.172 Just as 
important, however, is the impact of the nuisance easement on the 
Neighbor's right to security. The elements of the right to security 
163 This unlimited divisibility is an example of the commoditization of property that is integral 
to the allocational function of the market system. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: 
An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of the Law, 11 L. & SOC'y REV. 571, 573-75 (1977). 
Unlimited subdivision allows trade in, and thus reallocation of, property interests to take 
place with the greatest possible precision. 
164 An owner can create a temporal series of rights to possession and use by utilizing the 
life estate followed by a remainder and the landlord-tenant relationship. 
165 The residential tract development is a horizontal subdivision of land. The owner can 
subdivide the land vertically by creating such interests as air rights, rights to timber, and 
rights to subsurface minerals. 
166 A detailed taxonomy of the ten functional elements of the "liberal concept of ownership" 
appears in Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A. Guest ed. 
1961). 
J67 For a discussion of the several ways of holding simultaneous rights in land, see T. BERGIN 
& P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 53-55 (2d ed. 1984). 
168 The "right to security," in Honore's taxonomy, "is consistent with the existence of a 
power to expropriate or divest in the state or public authorities." Honore, supra note 166, at 
119-20. 
169 Honore's term is "the prohibition of harmful use." I d. at 123. This is simply the "sic utere 
... " concept that is the basis of nuisance. See supra note 92. 
170 The strength of the concept of security of tenure is demonstrated by the common law 
aphorism that the very fact of a trespass implies damage. 6A A. CASNER, AMERICAN LAW 
OF PROPERTY § 28.12 (1954). 
171 In practice, certain private entities, such as common carrier public utilities, also hold the 
eminent domain power. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 901 (1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-
8-1 (Burns 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-17.6 (West 1969). 
172 See supra notes 96-121 and accompanying text. 
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are contained in the implicit bargain173 over property set out in our 
constitutions-"nor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation. "174 Government has the power to expro-
priate property, but only if it gives compensation to the expropriated 
owner. Only government enjoys that power. And government may 
exercise the power only if government itself is to use the expropri-
ated property. Otherwise, dominion is absolute. 
However much this implicit bargain might remain a viable element 
ofthe lay legal myth, the emergence of a mature capitalistic economy 
has eroded its practical force. Because capitalism requires public 
regulation and public planning as well as entrepreneurship, the role 
of government and the consequential impact on private property is 
necessarily large. 175 The rise of the administrative state has meant 
that the government's burgeoning regulatory activities can erode 
the use right of the property owner substantially, and thus erode 
the effective value of his title security as well. 176 The rise of the 
activist state, planning, coordinating, and even carrying out sub-
stantial entrepreneurial activities, has meant that government may 
expropriate his title for private uses as well as public. 177 
Despite the considerable erosion of the right to security that this 
role entails, however, security of tenure erodes only when govern-
ment takes the initiative. The considerable significance of the nuis-
173 See F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 12-13 (1985). 
174 U.S. CONST. amend. V. For similar language, see, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 11; DEL. 
CONST. art. I, § 8; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 7. 
175 See C. LINDBLOM, supra note 2, at 313-29. 
176 This erosion takes place as a "regulatory taking." Judicial practice has ratified substantial 
erosion of the use right without, however, having solved the seemingly intractable problem 
of developing a theory that adequately contains it. Only ad hoc notions, inadequate for the 
purposes of theory, have emerged, such as loss of investment backed expectations, loss of the 
opportunity for economic return, or regulation that goes "too far." E.g., Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1247 (1987); MacDonald, Sommers & Frates v. 
Yolo County, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985); Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 
74,83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Central Transp. 
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 415 (1922). 
177 For example, in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) the Supreme Court held that the 
government may validly expropriate for private use if that private use will serve the public 
benefit. The undertaking challenged in Berman v. Parker is prototypical of the activist state-
the government of the District of Columbia, in order to eradicate an extensive slum area, 
proposed to take the entire area by eminent domain, raze it, plan a totally new pattern of 
uses for it, install the utility and service infrastructure to serve these uses, and then sell off 
the various parcels to private entities to develop them according to the use plan. 
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ance easement is that owner's security of tenure erodes at the ini-
tiative of private entities as well. 178 The expanded role of government 
in economic processes has eroded the property owner's security of 
tenure substantially. The further erosion, at the initiative of private 
entities, of what remains of security of tenure will be felt especially 
keenly. 179 
If the loss of security of tenure goes to the fact of ownership, a 
second element of subjective value, the loss of sentimental value, 
goes to the quality of the property that is harmed. Neighbor's family 
may have held the property for several generations, the property 
might have been the site of significant events in Neighbor's life, or 
the property may possess special attributes that appeal to her idio-
syncratic tastes. Alternatively, the fact of possessing that particular 
property might be central to her self-definition.180 Whatever the 
particular ingredients of this sentimental value, for so long as she 
remains committed to owning that property, the amount that a 
willing buyer might offer for it will fall short of her valuation of it. 
A third element of subjective value, closely connected to the value 
that arises from security of tenure, is what might best be called 
psychic value. One aspect of this value is the apparent inertia that 
comes with ownership. Once an owner becomes committed to holding 
particular property, reaching the decision to give it up often involves 
a considerable psychic cost. 181 Another aspect of psychic value is 
captured by the phenomenon that carries the label "hysteresis"-we 
tend to feel losses more acutely than gains of comparable magni-
tude. 182 
178 Because of producer control of the public choice process, private initiative works as well 
through government to erode the property rights of consumers. 
179 This is entailed by the phenomenon of diminishing marginal value, discussed infra notes 
184-86 and accompanying text. The reverse of this phenomenon means that, as the level of a 
particular good falls, further losses are felt even more keenly. Honore has pointed out the 
consequences of the loss of security of tenure: "From the point of view of security of property, 
it is important that when expropriation takes place, adequate compensation should be paid; 
but a general power to expropriate subject to paying compensation would be fatal to the 
institution of ownership as we know it." Honore, supra note 166. 
180 This is captured, in the context of takings doctrine, as "objects ... closely bound up 
with personhood because they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing 
personal entities in the world." Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 
(1982). 
181 An example of this phenomenon is the consistent difference between the "bid" and "ask" 
prices in the listings of the over the counter securities market that cannot be accounted for 
by explicit transaction costs like brokerage fees. 
182 R. HARDIN, supra note 32, at 64. Hardin derives this notion from David Hume's A 
Treatise of Human Nature. See id. at 82. 
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The explanation for these phenomena comes from the economist's 
notion of income effects. 183 Most people exhibit a diminishing sub-
jective value for most goods, including money. The more a person 
has of a particular good, the less he values an additional amount of 
that good. 184 Thus, if he is threatened with the loss of a particular 
good, he will offer less to avoid the loss than he would accept in 
compensation for the 10ss.185 For that reason, two individuals with 
precisely the same value preferences for a particular piece of prop-
erty will tend to quote different prices if one of them does not own 
it and is asked what she would give for it and the other owns it and 
is asked what compensation he wants for its expropriation. 186 To an 
objective observer, the second individual is exhibiting "subjective 
value." 
Risk is the final element of subjective value. It is clear that people 
would not choose to spend their lives at either of the opposite ex-
tremes of complete contingency and of complete stability. It is also 
clear, however, that different people prefer to occupy different po-
sitions across the continuum between those extremes. One way of 
describing the preference of any particular person is in terms of her 
183 See generally A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: THEORY IN USE 
24 (1969); J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND ApPLICATIONS 100-01 (1976). 
184 A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 183, at 22-23. Take an individual with a wealth 
level of $1000. The drop in his overall level of value were he to lose $100 of that wealth would 
be greater than the gain in value that he would experience were his wealth level to increase 
by $100. The explanation is this: because of the phenomenon of diminishing value, he values 
the money between the levels of $900 and $1,000 more than the money between the levels of 
$1,000 and $1,100. 
185 Mishan, Welfare Criteria for External Effects, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 594, 602-03 (1961). 
That is, because of the phenomenon of diminishing value, he assigns more value to a dollar 
that he has and must give up than he assigns to a dollar that he does not have and is being 
offered. 
186 This is an extreme example of the concept: 
On issues that make a significant difference to the individual's welfare the difference 
between the maximum sum he would pay to avoid a certain fate (his view being 
permanently obscured, or his peace being shattered over a long period) and the 
minimum sum he would accept for submitting to that fate is likely to be far greater 
than is habitually suggested by our notions of differences in welfare effect, so fre-
quently assumed negligible in order to reach elegant theoretical results. The current 
and prospective income and assets of a person form a limit to the maximum he can 
afford to pay and remain alive, while no such limit restricts the minimum sum he 
would consent to receive. A man dying of thirst in the middle of the Sahara could 
offer, for a bucket of water that would save his life, no more than his prospective 
earnings (above some subsistence level). And this sum would be infinitesimal com-
pared with the sum of money needed to induce him to forgo the bucket of water and 
fatally reduce his chance of survival. 
Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 255,272 n.2 (1967). 
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affinity for, or aversion to, risk. 187 To the extent that an individual 
is risk averse, then to that same extent she accords value to being 
immune from expropriation. 
These notions are relevant to the discussion at hand because a 
L UL U often is an entrepreneurial enterprise. The term "entrepre-
neurial" connotes the idea that the enterprise was undertaken as a 
risk of present capital for the possibility of future profit. Whenever 
a L UL U takes a property interest from Neighbor, this property 
interest has now been folded into the enterprise and subjected to 
the same risk. To the extent that Neighbor is typical, that is, risk 
averse, she will have a less accepting attitude toward risk than the 
enterprise owner. Thus, to the extent of the property expropriation, 
she has been forced to accept a degree of risk higher than her 
preference. 188 
b. Measuring Value 
The second question addresses the likelihood that the litigation 
process will be an effective mechanism for Neighbor to recover the 
highly subjective monetary value of the harm that the LULU will 
cause. The answer, regrettably, is that this likelihood is low. In the 
first place, the nature of the process works against her. As a civil 
187 The same general phenomenon of diminishing value also underlies the notion of risk. A 
risk averse person exhibits a declining marginal utility for further wealth; a risk neutral 
person exhibits indifference between present and potential wealth; and a risk accepting person 
values potential wealth more highly than existing wealth. The fact that most people exhibit 
diminishing marginal value indicates that most people are at least mildly risk averse. 
188 This point is made in Calabresi, The New Economic Analysis of Law: Scholarship, 
Sophistry, or Self-Indulgence?, in PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 85, 95-96 (1981): 
So long as a law imposes an equal risk of loss and gain on groups whose aversion to 
risk differs, it has significant distributional consequences. It follows that an 'ineffi-
cient' law that results in randomly chosen losers and winners may none the less be 
desirable, because it entails a gamble that is more desired by those we wish to favour 
on distributional grounds. An efficient law may impose a gamble that has the converse 
effect, and may, for that reason, be undesirable. 
I d. at 96 (footnote omitted). The point being made here is the narrow one of the nature of the 
loss that the LULU Neighbor has suffered-from the point of view of the Neighbor. As will 
be discussed below, there are other questions of relevance. One of these has to do with 
whether it is objectively proper that the Neighbor be allowed to count the risk imposition as 
a loss that demands compensation. For instance, one might take a social policy viewpoint and 
say that society is worse off if we allow the risk averse always to stand in the way of the risk 
accepting entrepreneur. That the common law of tort is biased in favor of the risk acceptor is 
discussed infra notes 253-61 and accompanying text. If, however, one takes the viewpoint of 
individual rights and liberties, then the sUbjective preferences of the individual, however 
much they deviate either from the norm preferences of society as a whole, or from some other 
societal standard, are to be accorded protection in order for individual rights to have opera-
tional meaning. 
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plaintiff, Neighbor carries the evidentiary burdens of coming for-
ward and of persuasion. Necessarily, then, whatever award she 
ultimately achieves will be eroded substantially by litigation costs189 
and attorney's fees. Her award will come at a substantial discount. 190 
The attitude of the jury will present further problems. The jury 
is nominally impartial. Up to the point of a judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, however, a civil jury has significant leeway in finding 
the facts and applying the law. Because of the suasive force of the 
trial's ritualistic aspects, jurors are not likely to take a decision to 
depart from the judge's guidance lightly. If they do decide to depart, 
they might do so in either direction. If they are modest landowners 
like Neighbor, they will want to sympathize with her plight. The 
potential, however, for adverse effects on the financial viability of a 
major local employer that a large verdict for plaintiff might cause 
will not be lost on the typical juror. Jury departures from judicial 
guidance, then, are likely to be random and thus capricious in their 
effects. 
If the jury chooses to be impartial, it will tend to see the process 
of proof as a game between the plaintiff and the defendant. Neighbor 
logically will try to take into account the full range of subjective 
considerations in her offer of proof. The jury, however, will perceive 
her estimates of value as rising from a strategy of overstating her 
harm-asking for too much in order to end up with the correct 
amount. The L UL U Owner, just as logically, will limit its offer of 
proof to objective considerations. The jury will perceive this as a 
strategy parallel to that of Neighbor's strategy. In response, the 
jury is likely to engage in baby-splitting. 
The final problem is the quality of Neighbor's testimony. She will 
be attempting to articulate what cannot be articulated easily, the 
elements that make up the considerably subjective value that she 
attaches to her land. If the jury is impartial, her valuation will appear 
to be puffing. If the jury is even mildly pro-defendant, she will 
appear to be grasping. 191 
189 A L UL U defendant can be much like the prototypical institutional defendant, the insur-
ance company-resource, and thus skills, rich, and a repeat player, with the highest incentive 
to "litigate tough," perhaps to the point of disserving its interests in the particular case, in 
order to develop a reputation that could discourage future plaintiffs. For a brief analysis, see 
C. GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS: CASES AND MATERIALS 85-86 (1984). 
190 See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. 
191 In the Atlantic Cement litigation, Oscar Boomer was attempting to recover damages for 
the harm caused by cement particulate to his property, "about 8 acres, on which are situated 
a garage in which plaintiff conducted a used auto parts business and did auto body and fender 
work, and two small one-car garages, one metal." Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 72 Misc.2d 
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C. Conceptions of Existence 
This extensive litany, however, has not yet exhausted the notion 
of subjective value. The preceding discussion of the nature and 
extent of Neighbor's loss focuses on what in fact is a narrow view 
of property rights, one that implicitly defines the relationship be-
tween Neighbor and her property in terms of dominion. l92 Under 
this view, we considered her losses in terms of the erosion of her 
theoretically near-absolute dominion. 
N ow consider Neighbor's property from a different point of view. 
Regardless of its particular intrinsic attributes, that property might 
be located in a neighborhood in which community values are high. 
The typical example is the ethnic neighborhood. 193 Here will be found 
834, 836, 340 N. Y. S.2d 97, 100 (1972). His testimony on his personal evaluation of the damage 
offers an interesting case in point: 
On cross-examination (p. 48, 49, Vol. 1) Mr. Boomer testified that he arrived at the 
price of $350,000 thusly: 
"Q. Now, this price that you put on this land of $350,000, how did you arrive at 
that figure? 
MR. DUNCAN: Your Honor, I object again. The man gave the price as to what 
he felt it was worth to give to Atlantic. He is taking an old Bill of Particulars from 
1964 to impeach him. This is the price the man said he wanted. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. (Continuing) I have got two small boys that would like to go in the salvage 
business. The youngest one is 11 years old. Now, between the time he gets to where 
he can run this salvage business and the time he retires at 65, there is a lot of space 
in between. $350,000 falls in there. 
BY MR. TRACY (continuing) 
Q. That's what you based it on? 
A. On my children, yes, sir. 
Q. And that is the basis for putting the figure of $350,000 on it? 
A. Yes." 
Id. at 839-40, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 103. Is this testimony grasping? It depends on your attitude 
toward Oscar Boomer. 
192 The basic notion which underlies Honore's concept of full, liberal ownership is dominion. 
See Honore, supra note 166. 
193 The terms "neighborhood" and "community" are used to denote opposite poles of a 
spectrum which itself describes a locality with attributes of cohesion and continuity beyond 
an impersonal, atomized urban residential area or a neighborhood that coalesces ad hoc and 
pro tern around a transient issue (such as the Massachusetts communities that organized to 
oppose the hazardous waste facilities). As to the end of this spectrum where these attributes 
are least strong, Jane Jacobs has given a functional definition of the urban neighborhood as 
an organ of "city self-government or self-management" which provides "webs of public sur-
veillance" and "networks of everyday public life." J. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT 
AMERICAN CITIES 114, 119 (1961). See also A. DOWNS, NEIGHBORHOODS AND URBAN DE-
VELOPMENT 13-19 (1981) [hereinafter NEIGHBORHOODS] (defining the urban neighborhood in 
terms of a combination of geography, social relationships, and expectations about continuation 
of these relationships); Schoenberg, Criteria for the Evaluation of Neighborhood Viability in 
Working Class and Low Income Areas in Core Cities, 27 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 69 (1979) (defining 
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a milieu of value homogeneity and psychic support. Here also will 
be found a web of in-kind trade of goods and services194 that is not 
possible in an anonymous, transient neighborhood. The value to 
Neighbor of such a milieu is considerable. 
Notice, however, the way in which this value accrues to her. Under 
the dominion concept of property entitlements, Neighbor has rights 
to the particular property. The sole functioning of this property is 
instrumental to her as an autonomous person. Under this alternative 
view, there is a larger tract of property that "contains" a neighbor-
hood with strong communal values. The entitlement that anyone 
member holds to anyone portion of that tract, looked at from the 
point of view of dominion, has little meaning in terms of that com-
munity. Because of the existence of the community, the tract has a 
significance that is greater than the sum of the discrete parcels into 
which it might be carved. 195 
In this alternative sense, what Neighbor holds is not an entitle-
ment to property, but instead an entitlement in property. Her en-
titlement performs a function far different from the subordinated, 
instrumental function of the dominion point of view. Here, her en-
titlement performs an enabling function, allowing her the opportu-
neighborhood vitality in terms of agreement about public behavior and processes for defining 
and supporting goals over time). 
At the other end of the spectrum is community, which is defined both in terms of a particular 
spatial setting for social interactions and in terms of the nature and function of these inter-
actions-"normative social interaction and resulting social structure" and "shared collective 
representations and moral sentiments." A. HUNTER, SYMBOLIC COMMUNITIES: THE PERSIST-
ENCE AND CHANGE OF CHICAGO'S LOCAL COMMUNITIES 4 (1974). See also T. BENDER, 
COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 5-8 (1982) ("social space or network held 
together by shared understandings and a sense of obligation" in which individuals "are bound 
together by affective or emotional ties rather than by a perception of individual self interest"); 
H. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS: GROUP AND CLASS IN THE LIFE OF ITALIAN-AMERICANS 
104 (1982) ("an aggregate of people who occupy a common and bounded territol'Y within which 
they establish and participate in common institutions"); R. SENNETT, THE USES OF DISORDER: 
PERSONAL IDENTITY AND CITY LIFE 31 (1970) ("The bond of community is one of sensing 
common identity, a pleasure in recognizing 'us' and 'who we are."'); M. STEIN, THE ECLIPSE 
OF COMMUNITY: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN STUDIES 22-23 (1960) (an area with "its 
own peculiar traditions, customs, conventions, standards of decency and propriety, and ... a 
universe of discourse .... "). 
194 At its most rudimentary level, the viable neighborhood provides effective policing of 
common areas and monitoring of children at play. J. JACOBS supra note 193, at 119; O. 
NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN DESIGN 49-101 (1973). 
One characteristic of a strong community is the extensive in-kind economy through which the 
members share their particular talents and surplus goods. For a detailed, albeit fictional, 
description of such an in-kind economy in a traditional Native American-Hispanic culture, see 
J. NICHOLS, THE MAGIC JOURNEY (1978). 
195 From the standpoint of the community, its conception of the property is almost exactly 
the opposite of the commoditization, described in Balbus, supra note 163. 
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nity to be part of the community.196 In this view, the entitlement is 
mutually instrumental. It is instrumental to her to the extent that 
she defines herself through the community. At the same time, she 
is instrumental to the community to the extent that the fact of the 
community imposes necessary limitations on the unfettered entitle-
ment that the law allows her under the dominion point of view. 197 
The dominion concept of ownership fails to capture what in many 
instances will be the most important aspect of a landowner's exis-
tence. The compensation system requires Neighbor to establish ob-
jective, market-oriented values for the loss that she has suffered. 
If, however, Neighbor defines herself in terms of a cohesive com-
munity to which her entitlement enables her to belong, then the 
notion of monetary compensation is peculiarly irrelevant. Market 
value connotes price; price connotes trade. The value of community 
cannot be traded, however, to an outsider. The outsider cannot buy 
into the community. At most, he can hope eventually to become part 
of it. 198 
The concept of communal existence provides a lens for completing 
our exploration of the loss that a L UL U Neighbor suffers. 199 A tacit 
196 "There is a 'we-ness' in a community; one is a member. Sense of self and of community 
may be difficult to distinguish." T. BENDER, supra note 193 at 7-8. 
197 For conceptions of rights in land alternative to dominion, see Penn Central Transp. Co. 
v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324,328,366 N.E.2d 127l, 1275-76 (1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 
104 (1978) (dominion limited by social webs); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17-18, 
201 N.W.2d 761, 767-68 (1972) (dominion limited by biotic webs). 
198 A description of the converse idea, that providing ample money to a poor, traditional 
community so as to enable its members to satisfy their wants through the cash market and 
abandon their in-kind market leaves them, in a larger sense, far poorer, is convincingly 
developed in J. NICHOLS, supra note 194. Here is a perhaps extreme example from another 
culture and involving a far smaller level of detail, of a well-intentioned attempt to help a 
subsistence farmer in the Third World by giving him a tractor: 
And even in a system so near the edge of survival, there is still room for the very 
poor, by the most thrifty use of all its traditional elements .... Cow dung is used 
for fuel-the slow heat is just right for making curds-and for plastering walls and 
floors; a little milk from a starveling cow-there cannot be oxen without cows-
makes a vast difference to diet, or perhaps a little cash by sale of ghee: how will a 
tractor replace the dung, the plaster and the milk? 
G. HUNTER, MODERNIZING PEASANT SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN ASIA AND AF-
RICA 35 (1969). 
199 The exploration of communality which follows is taken from, and draws deeply on, Garet, 
supra note 86. This exploration proceeds on the assumption that constitutional principles 
ought to be read through the lenses of the three major constituents of the way that we exist, 
individuality, sociality, and communality. A rather fundamental problem with this assumption, 
of course, is that it risks committing the naturalistic fallacy-that which is, ought to be. The 
defense is provided by Alexis de Tocqueville's observation that we tend to judicialize every 
important political question. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J. Mayer 
ed. 1969). Thus, should not the law reflect who we are, especially in a system whose myth 
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conception of dichotomy between individual rights and state power 
seems to underlie much of our constitutional jurisprudence. 2oo The 
structure of the United States Constitution is altogether hospitable 
to this conception-the text of the Constitution itself consisting of a 
structured delegation of power to the federal state representing "we 
the people" and the Bill of Rights forming a structure of protection 
for the liberty of the autonomous individual. Because this constitu-
tional structure contains no grounds for preferring the people in 
common over the free individual, then the central problem of con-
stitutional jurisprudence involves a necessary tension between so-
ciety and individual as distinct and often conflicting foci of power. 
Missing from this tacit conception is the small community. As an 
entity intermediate between society and individual, it also functions 
as a focus of power in our ongoing political and social world. Despite 
this real function, however, the community has no formal place in 
the jurisprudential concept of our political structure. 
There are several explanations available for this tacit acceptance 
of dichotomy rather than trichotomy. An historical explanation 
places our constitutional experience in the larger development of the 
post-medieval liberal project-to make real the worth of the individ-
ual by sweeping away the medieval conception of the individual as 
subsumed within society, an organic whole composed of tight and 
inescapable small communities bound together into a larger, and 
strongly hierarchical, social body.201 In the liberal project, the small 
community is the symptom of all that was bad in the medieval 
order. 202 
holds that who we ought to be derives from what it is we do, rather than from, say, the 
dictates of an ascribed hierarchy? 
200 Indeed, this was assumed in the discussion supra notes 160-92 and accompanying text. 
In this tacit view, the local community has what amounts to an entirely derivative role, one 
that bridges the space between these two poles. Community provides a recognized option to 
the individual for achieving self-definition. Community also provides a vehicle to the powerless 
autonomous individual to achieve some standing in the ongoing competition of the larger 
society. Community is not, however, a separate object of concern. 
201 Robert Nisbet described the conservative conception of society, as contrasted with the 
modern conception based on the autonomous, though alienated free individual, as 
a view of man and society that stressed not the abstract individual and impersonal 
relations of contract but personality inextricably bound to the small social group; 
relationships of ascribed status and tradition; the functional interdependence of all 
parts of a society, including its prejudices and superstitions; the role of the sacred in 
maintaining order and integration; and, above all, the primacy of society to the 
individual. 
R. NISBET, COMMUNITY AND POWER 25 (1962). 
202 Gerald Frug took this historical approach in order to explain the subordinate and pow-
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Within the particular American historical experience, we have 
rendered the local community powerless in order to prevent it from 
acting as a force antithetical to the values chosen by the national 
society.203 An empowered local community could have frustrated the 
nineteenth century national economic goal of economic centraliza-
tion. 204 Moreover, an empowered local community could even today 
frustrate the realization of such societal values as the protection of 
individual rights and the fostering of equal protection. 205 
As James Madison's Federalist No. 10206 shows, the potential for 
small communities to engage in oppression by majorities was a sig-
nificant concern in the intellectual debate over the United States 
Constitution. It is likely that Federalist No. 10 is the most familiar 
of the Federalist Papers because its description of the dark side of 
community resonates so strongly within our own experience. 
Indeed, American writers have captured the American small town 
in caricature so well that their description itself has become a part 
of our political and social myth. 207 At its best, the American small 
town is a repository of cohesiveness, mutual support, and stability. 208 
At the same time, however, it is bigoted, repressive, hierarchical, 
and hypocritical. Because it is intolerant of heterogeneity, its values 
erless status of the local community in American law. See Frug, The City As A Legal Concept, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980). 
203 [d. at 1106. 
204 G. FREDERICKSON, THE INNER CIVIL WAR: NORTHERN INTELLECTUALS AND THE CRI-
SIS OF THE UNION (1965). Frederickson argues that the experiences of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. in the Civil War strongly shaped his thought: "[Holmes's] attempt to find and apply an 
empirical jurisprudence-a definition of the law which was grounded in the realities of power 
and history-was the natural enterprise of a man who had grown tired of the millennial 
expectations and abstract moralism of the war years." [d. at 208 (footnote omitted). The 
congeniality of Holmes's jurisprudential thought with fostering the reallocative power of the 
American economy is discussed infra notes 253-61 and accompanying text. 
205 Frug, supra note 202, at 1073. Liberal theory tends to replace the simple medieval vision 
of the world with a vision of a complex world made up of a congeries of dualities. To view 
political society as a duality between the sovereign individual and the sovereign state is 
congenial to the larger liberal vision in a way that a trichotomy that includes the local 
community is not. [d. at 1074-76. 
206 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 47, at 60-61. 
207 See R. LINGEMAN, SMALL TOWN AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 1620-THE PRESENT 
364-391 (1980). For fictional accounts, see S. ANDERSON, WINESBURG, OHIO (1919); H. LEE, 
To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960); S. LEWIS, MAIN STREET (1920); E. MASTERS, SPOON RIVER 
ANTHOLOGY (1915). For a non-fictional account, see T. VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP: THE 
CASE OF AMERICA 142-65 (1967), an account which begins: "The country town of the great 
American farming region is the perfect flower of self-help and cupidity standardised on the 
American plan." [d. at 142. See also A. VIDICH & J. BENSMAN, SMALL TOWN IN MASS 
SOCIETY: CLASS, POWER AND RELIGION IN A RURAL COMMUNITY 49-78 (1968). 
208 For an account of the myth of the benign small community, see J. ROBERTSON supra 
note 12, at 215-18. 
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clash strongly with societal notions of a pluralism of values and the 
equal worth of individuals. 209 
It can be argued, however, that the language of the United States 
Constitution does not compel that rights and power have meaning 
only through the categories of "individual" and "society. "210 The 
language of the first amendment, for instance, is not couched in 
terms of individual rights. Indeed, a rights-holder is mentioned for 
only one of the three rights set out in that amendment, the right to 
assemble. And that rights-holder is not the individual but "the peo-
ple." 
Even the tacit view of a dichotomy between individuality and 
sociality represents a way of reading constitutional language. 211 Un-
der the tacit view, society functions both as a locus of power and as 
a focus of rights distinct from and often in conflict with the individual. 
Yet, it is possible to make a rationally powerful argument, grounded 
in the Enlightenment philosophy that was so congenial to the intel-
lectual thought that underlay the Constitution, that society-"the 
people"-represents not so much a separate locus of power and 
rights as a summation of the values of the free and autonomous 
individuals who make up that society.212 Thus, such categories as 
209 Complicating our exploration of communality is the problem that communities, taken in 
the normal meaning of the word as distinguished from the more specialized definitions offered 
supra note 207 come in a variety of forms. Richard Sennett has explored much of the range 
of possibilities. See generally R. SENNETT, supra note 193. Communities in this normal usage 
that nevertheless contain few or no attributes of communality include the hierarchical small 
town and the affluent suburb. Examples of the former are discussed in T. VEBLEN, supra 
note 207; A. VIDICH & J. BENSMAN, supra note 207; R. LINGEMAN, supra note 207. Examples 
of the latter are discussed in A. DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY 
FOR AMERICA 1-25 (1973); J. ROBERTSON, supra note 12, at 247-49; R. SENNETT, supra note 
193, at 68-73. Communities that possess a high degree of communality include, of course, the 
ethnic neighborhood as described in, for instance, H. GANS, supra note 193. They also include 
what Sennett calls the assimilating community of the "interpenetrated ghetto." R. SENNETT, 
supra note 193, at 53-57. The point is that none of these forms has a monopoly over the worst 
attributes of the values that the local community, taken in the normal sense, can possess-
bigotry, repression, hierarchy, and hypocrisy. These values can arise all across the spectrum 
of community forms. 
210 Garet, supra note 86, at 1003, 1008. 
211 See id. at 1007. 
212 The argument is set out in R. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). See especially id. at 1-18, 107-12, 331. The theory of the state 
upon which this argument is based is quite close to Robert Nozick's minimal state (the "Night 
Watchman State"). See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26-27 (1974). It strongly 
contrasts with the concept of the liberal political order that understands the world "as a series 
of complex dualities." Frug, supra note 202, at 1075. Although the strict compensation theory 
developed in Epstein's article is altogether congenial to the approach to solving the problem 
of the effect of LULUs on Neighbors advocated in this Article, the underlying view of 
individual rights in land which this Article assumes is not congenial to the theory developed 
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individual and society can properly be deemed structures through 
which to effectuate the principles that the Constitution establishes. 
More particularly, they represent structures, both alternative and 
complementary, of the way we exist as humans. 213 To accept the 
argument that constitutional principles ought to be read through the 
way that we structure our existence214 provides not only a way to 
in the Epstein article, in principal part because this Article assumes that individual rights in 
land ought not to be understood solely as dominion, that individual rights are not lexically 
prior to social power, and that we ought to interpret our basic principles through the lens of 
communality as well as through the lenses of individuality and sociality. 
There is a line among the fragments of the Greek poet Archilochus which says: 'The 
fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.' Scholars have differed 
about the correct interpretation of these dark words, which may mean no more than 
that the fox, for all his cunning, is defeated by the hedgehog's one defence. But, 
taken figuratively, the words can be made to yield a sense in which they mark one 
of the deepest differences which divide writers and thinkers, and, it may be, human 
beings in general. For there exists a great chasm between those, on one side, who 
relate everything to a single central vision, one system less or more coherent or 
articulate, in terms of which they understand, think and feel-a single, universal, 
organizing principle in terms of which alone all that they are and say has significance-
and, on the other side, those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even 
contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way, for some psychological 
or physiological cause, related by no moral or aesthetic principle .... 
1. BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox: AN ESSAY ON TOLSTOY'S VIEW OF HISTORY 1 
(1953) (footnote omitted). 
213 Garet, supra note 86, at 1002, 1016-17. 
214 This Article accepts the intrinsic value of community on the basis that Garet advances, 
that it is an essential constituent of the way that we structure our existence, a "necessary 
mode of existence," but that it is lexically neither prior to nor subsidiary to the other two 
ways that we structure our existence. Id. at 1066. Perhaps a symptom that the emphasis over 
the last thirty years on individual rights has taken the notion of the autonomous individual to 
the limit is the considerable outpouring of legal and philosophical writing either that values 
communality on a basis identical or similar to that of Garet's, or that advances communality 
as lexically prior. E.g., M. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY 
124, 132 (1985) (for theological reasons, law should be seen as a medium through which we 
achieve an authentic community); S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY 
OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 305-21 (1980) (meaning is the current determination of the 
relevant interpretive community); A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL 
THEORY 146 (1981) (a neo-Aristotelian argument that moral virtue ought to be realized through 
the political community as a common project); K. SALE, HUMAN SCALE 180-81 (1980) (for 
genetic reasons, the loss of communal life lies at the heart of the malaise of modern culture); 
M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 150, 173 (1982) (because community 
is a constituent of the identity of the individual, justice requires that community be a constit-
uent of society); Cornell, The Problem of Normative Authority in Legal Interpretation, 54 
TENN. L. REV. 327, 330-31 (1987) (meaning in the law is guided by the vision of community 
that underlies the normative authority of the law, a vision based on the Hegelian concept of 
a community of mutual recognition); Deutsch, Law, Capitalism, and the Future, 28 U. FLA. 
L. REV. 309, 348-50 (1976) (Mormonism, defined as seeing the social community as the locus 
within which aspirations to divine perfection are realized, embodies Max Weber's Protestant 
Ethic most precisely; the law performs the social function necessitated by the Protestant 
Ethic). 
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understand more completely the problems of distributive justice 
caused by the law of nuisance but also, as this Article argues, an 
approach to solving these problems. 
There are three structures of human existence-personhood, com-
munality, and sociality.215 Moreover, there is no a priori basis for 
giving anyone of these three structures priority any more than 
there is in the more traditional view to rank either individuality or 
sociality over the other.216 Anyone person sees one or another of 
these structures as properly dominant in his own existence. 
Although communality has no formal status under the traditional 
constitutional dichotomy, the courts exhibit an uneasy awareness 
and tacit acceptance of the power of communities and the important 
role that they play in structuring our existence. The traditional 
dichotomy, for instance, is not adequate to explain how the United 
States Supreme Court has resolved particular disputes. 217 For in-
stance, Wisconsin v. Yoder,218 in which the Supreme Court allowed 
Amish and Mennonite communities to be exempted from full com-
pliance with a state compulsory schooling statute, cannot be ex-
plained wholly in terms of freedom of association. The outcome 
strongly protects freedom of association for the parents. Exempting 
the children from the compulsory schooling statute, however, sub-
stantially erodes the practical possibility of freedom of association 
for the children. The outcome makes eminent sense, however, in 
terms of communality because the Court allows the Amish commu-
nity to use communality as a bulwark against the solidarity-threat-
ening dictates of a larger, and alien, society speaking through the 
state. 
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,219 the Court declined to take 
jurisdiction over a statutory civil rights challenge by a female mem-
ber of a Native American tribe to a gender-discriminatory tribal 
membership rule. This is another case that cannot be explained 
215 "Life not subject to the call of groupness is as difficult for us to imagine as life not subject 
to the individuating call of personhood or to the sociating call of sociality." Garet, supra note 
86, at 1070. Individuality, "not being what we are" (as in Jean Paul Sartre's concept of the 
freedom of existence to choose itself), carries the psychological correlate of dread and the 
associated right not to be made into a determined thing; sociality, "being what we are not 
(yet)," carries the psychological correlate of hope, and the associated right to move toward 
the realization of our common humanity; and communality, "an achievement of the 'we are,'" 
carries the psychological correlate of celebration and the associated right to be sustained in 
groupness against external coercion. Id. at 1069-74. 
216Id. at 1065-68. 
217 The discussion which follows is a recapitulation of the analysis in id. at 1029-36. 
218 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
219 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
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consistently in terms of the traditional dichotomy of individuality 
and sociality. The outcome is at odds with both the individual right 
to associate with the group and the interest of society to further 
equality by repressing gender-based discrimination. Like Yoder, 
however, Santa Clara can be explained very satisfactorily as a de-
cision that allows the group to resist the power of general society to 
impose laws that erode attributes that are basic to the way that the 
group defines itself. 
This reading of Yoder and Santa Clara demonstrates that the 
recognition of communality requires an erosion of values associated 
with both individuality and sociality. Communality is simply dicho-
tomous to them. This cannot, however, count as a fatal flaw. After 
all, individuality and sociality are themselves mutually dichotomous. 
If sociality were the principal consideration, our criminal law would 
undoubtedly be grounded more strongly in the function of finding 
out the truth. With individuality taken into equal consideration, 
however, protection of the helpless individual before the mighty 
engine of public justice erodes substantially the function of truth 
finding. 
It is possible, of course, to read Yoder and Santa Clara Pueblo in 
a more limited way. The communities involved in these decisions are 
marginal in two senses-both remote in style and substance from 
the American mainstream and far from secure in their prospects for 
long-term survival. These decisions give deference to the values held 
by such marginal communities that clash with individual rights and 
general societal values, excepting them from the norms that main-
stream society must follow, only because that deference serves to 
preserve the heterogeneity that these communities bring to society. 
Read this way, these two decisions are self-limiting to marginal 
groups. 
In dealing with conflicts over land regulation by local government, 
however, the Supreme Court has more consistently and less ambig-
uously accepted communality not as an aspect of marginal commu-
nities but of mainstream communities as well. This acceptance was 
clearly manifest in the Court's first ratification of the zoning power 
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO.220 In Euclid, the Village 
had adopted a zoning ordinance in order to deflect what it foresaw 
as strong market pressures for commercial and industrial develop-
ment that would change its residential character.221 In ratifying the 
220 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
221 [d. at 379-80. Apparently the zoning ordinance was ineffective in deflecting the economic 
pressures. Although the Village ordinance restricted the site at issue in the Euclid dispute 
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use of the zoning power to provide a bulwark against these economic 
forces, the Court did not limit its use to deflecting development of a 
totally different nature. Rather, the Court made clear that the local 
community could deflect as well more intensive residential develop-
ment that would threaten the particular residential character that it 
possessed: 
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out 
that the development of detached house sections is greatly re-
tarded by the coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes 
resulted in destroying the entire section for private house pur-
poses; that in such sections very often the apartment house is a 
mere parasite .... Under these circumstances, apartment 
houses, which in a different environment would be not only 
entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable, come very near to 
being nuisances. 222 
By this language, the Court came close to saying that majoritarian 
local values were an adequate basis to deflect what might perhaps 
uncharitably be called "people pollution." Some fifty years later, in 
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,223 the Court all but sang a paean 
to the "nice" residential enclave: "A quiet place where yards are 
wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guide-
lines in a land-use project addressed to family needs."224 Although 
the Court decided Warth v. Seldin225 and Agins v. City of Tiburon226 
in the express contexts of standing and open space preservation, 
these decisions also have the effect of ratifying the exercise of the 
zoning power in order to prevent subdivision and more intensive 
development of residential land that would nevertheless continue a 
dominant residential use. 227 
to residential use, the site was subsequently developed for manufacturing use. C. HAAR & L. 
LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 1098 (2d ed. 1985). 
222 Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394-95. 
223 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
224 Id. at 9. 
225 422 U. S. 490 (1975) (non-resident minority individuals, two social action groups, and a 
construction trade association all had no standing to challenge an exclusionary suburban zoning 
ordinance as violative of first, ninth, and fourteenth amendment rights). 
226 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (a zoning ordinance that limited, for the purpose of open space 
preservation, the number of parcels into which a uniquely scenic tract could be subdivided 
did not, on its face, effect a taking requiring compensation. 
227 The Supreme Court let stand Construction Industries Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 
F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding a local zoning plan designed to shift the pattern of new 
housing construction from single-family to multi-family, shift the location of new construction 
geographically within the boundaries of the locality, and retard the overall rate of develop-
ment), cen. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1975) and Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N. Y.2d 359, 285 
N.E.2d 291 (1972) (upholding a local zoning plan designed to alter the interim pace, but not 
the ultimate amount, of residential development in order to minimize the cost of providing 
1988] LULUs AND NIMBYs 489 
The situations in which the Court has rejected the use of the 
zoning power have been few. The local community cannot use the 
zoning power for the purpose of establishing barriers against ethnic 
or racial minorities,228 the physically or mentally handicapped,229 or 
families. 230 Taken together, these decisions contrast rather sharply 
with state court decisions that flatly reject attempts by local com-
munities to erect barriers against newcomers with lower economic 
status. 231 These decisions, however, not only are consistent with the 
solicitude for ethnic and cultural heterogeneity that the Court 
showed in Yoder and Santa Clara Pueblo, but also extend the solic-
itude for their value as marginal communities to communities with 
more mainstream values. 232 
The notion of communality, then, brings out an important distinc-
tion, that between community values and the value of community. 
The values that particular communities hold often clash with impor-
tant values associated with individuality and sociality. This clash has 
been so strong that, as a political society, we have tended to render 
community legally powerless. In so doing, however, we have lost 
the value that communities bring. They can serve both as a bulwark 
for the autonomous individual against the often repressive power of 
the general society and as a milieu in which an individual can achieve 
a form of definition that is alternative to that of the autonomous 
the public facilities infrastructure required to serve that development), appeal dismissed, 409 
U.S. 1003 (1972). 
22H Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977). 
229 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), discussed infra 
notes 242-45 and accompanying text. 
230 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
231 E.g., S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,336 A.2d 
713 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mount Laurel!); National 
Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). 
232 Another area in which courts tend to recognize the defining value of communality is in 
the area of equitable servitudes. For instance, in Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 
N.W. 496 (1925), the Michigan court allowed enforcement of a set of restrictive covenants 
that were highly inadequate at law because "[f]or upward of 30 years the united efforts of all 
persons interested have carried out the common purpose of making and keeping all the lots 
strictly for residences, and defendants are the first to depart therefrom." [d. at 232,206 N.W. 
at 497. But see Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61 
N. Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N. Y.S.2d 901 (1984), discussed infra notes 239-41 and 
accompanying text. Courts do not, however, consistently give recognition to communality. 
The same Michigan court produced a particularly prominent example in Poletown Neighbor-
hood Council v. City of Detroit, 4lO Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) by adopting the concept 
of Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), that takings for a private use nevertheless are valid 
under the takings clause if such private benefits are merely incident to a greater public benefit. 
The Michigan court, however, did not in its analysis of the public benefit, take into account 
the lost communality values of the ethnic neighborhood that would be destroyed by a taking 
for a private manufacturing use. 
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individual. Because community can also serve as a vehicle for the 
powerless individual to achieve effective power in public processes, 
community also serves sociality by working to perfect the perfor-
mance of pluralism as a means for marshalling societal values. 
These values, however, are derivative. To accept communality as 
a structure of existence means to accept it on a coequal basis with 
individuality and sociality, not because it has derivative value to the 
other two structures of existence, but because it is intrinsically 
valuable in itself. It is intrinsically valuable because it is an essential 
part of the scheme of our existence as human beings. 
Completing this scheme of existence reveals the ultimate inade-
quacy of the normal approach to compensation that our remedial law 
takes. When a L UL U threatens communality, its derivative value 
both to individuality and to sociality are eroded. The Neighbor can 
vindicate the loss to individuality. The loss to sociality cannot be 
vindicated because the proper party, society, acts through the legal 
process as both fact finder and law giver. Society cannot be party 
and judge at the same time. Nor is it clear how communality can be 
represented in the remedial process. Finally, the problems of val-
uation seem to be as intractable as the problems of representation. 
If the derivative values of communality fall through the crack of 
subjectivity, the intrinsic value of communality would seem to be 
beyond the comprehension of the remedial process. 
IV. DILEMMAS 
The argument to this point has proceeded from the proposition 
that it is not possible to understand fully the nature and scope of 
the values at stake in any conflict over a L UL U except through a 
three-part conception of human existence. In order to understand 
the significance of this proposition, let us assume a trichotomy of 
individualism, sociality, and communality and explore a NIMBY 
conflict in which the L UL U is not an acknowledged bad but is, 
instead, people pollution. 
A. Halfway Houses 
The smoke-belching factory is the prototypical nuisance of the 
economic and lega1233 literature. With the career of federal air pol-
233 E.g., W. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 214-16 (1979); 
A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-14 (1983); R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 54-56 (3d ed. 1986); Coase, supra note 131, at 41-42. 
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lution regulation well into its second decade,234 however, the courts 
are seeing a more imaginative variety of complaints. The shadowy 
invasion that the Wisconsin court suppressed in Prah v. Maretti235 
is only one example. In addition, the halfway house is beginning to 
establish itself in the firmament of prototypical L UL U s. 
The halfway house, by definition, cannot serve its function unless 
it is located in a residential area. Also by definition, the residents of 
a halfway house are different in some overt way from the surround-
ing residents. This difference almost inevitably generates strong 
objections from the neighbors. The legal disputes that result illus-
trate the deep policy paradoxes which the NIMBY reaction raises. 
Neighbors have turned to a variety of approaches in order to block 
halfway houses. The courts have, however, in most cases frustrated 
their efforts. An attempt to enjoin a halfway house for prison par-
olees failed in Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-Way House, Inc. 236 The 
Connecticut Supreme Court held that the halfway house was, of 
itself, a "reasonable" use. 237 In addition, the court summarily dis-
missed the fears of the neighbors as "speculative and intangible. "238 
An attempt to block a halfway house on contract grounds failed in 
Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Services 
Group.239 Establishing this halfway house, which was to serve men-
tally retarded adults, clearly violated restrictive covenants control-
ling the site and the surrounding land. 240 The New York Court of 
Appeals, however, had little difficulty in deciding that enforcement 
of the covenants would have contravened public policy.241 
A third approach, capture of the local political process, also failed. 
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,242 neighborhood pres-
sure applied through the local land regulation process resulted in 
234 The present federal regulatory program dates from the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1970, P.L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676; (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7418, 7521-7615, 
7641-7642 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). 
235 Discussed supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text. 
236 153 Conn. 507, 218 A.2d 383 (1966). 
237 [d. at 510-11, 218 A.2d at 385-86. 
238 [d. at 511, 218 A.2d at 386. In 1985, the Arizona Supreme Court, in Armory Park 
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community Services, 148 Ariz. 1, 10, 712 P.2d 914, 923 
(1985), upheld the injunction of a community center that provided free meals to the indigent. 
The circumstances, however, were egregious. The neighbors showed, in graphic detail, the 
unfortunate activities that those who made use of the center carried out on the neighbors' 
property. 148 Ariz. at 3, 712 P.2d at 916. Thus, there was no lack of damaging invasions. [d. 
239 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336 (1984). 
240 [d. at 159, 460 N.E.2d at 1338. 
241 [d. at 160, 460 N.E.2d at 1339. 
242 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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the denial of a special use permit for a group home for the mentally 
retarded. 243 The United States Supreme Court held that the group 
home advanced an important public welfare goal, and that the con-
sequences of locating the facility in a residential area would not 
"pose any special threat to the city's legitimate interests .... "244 
The Court echoed the reaction of the Connecticut Supreme Court 
by treating the objections of the neighbors as "irrational prejudice 
against the mentally retarded."245 
The social policy considerations that the courts weighed in these 
decisions are necessary elements to any adequate analysis of the 
halfway house dispute. Solicitude for the mentally retarded strongly 
serves the equal protection principles that underlie sociality. Such 
solicitude also serves the notions of the dignity and fundamental 
worth of each individual that underlie individuality. To leave the 
weak behind is n(\t consistent with the most rudimentary notion of 
a civilized society. 246 
When the matter is analyzed from these perspectives, the NIMBY 
attitude of the neighbors is discomfiting. It is hard to fault people 
for objecting to the corrosive effects of airborne industrial pollution 
on person and property. It is somehow different in the case of a 
halfway house for the physically or mentally handicapped. To ratify 
their concerns is tantamount to allowing the Neighbors to claim harm 
by people pollution. 
This analysis, however, is substantially incomplete. Ifindividuality 
requires that the residents of the halfway house be taken into ac-
count, then the same consideration is required for the Neighbors. 
At risk is the value that they give to what most likely is their 
principal asset, their residence. As the foregoing analysis shows, 
this value has two bases-the instrumental value that accrues from 
the legal status of their entitlements as dominion and the derivative 
value that accrues as social status to the extent that their entitle-
ments attach to property that is part of a community. The harm to 
the instrumental value accrues as a diminution in the market price 
of the entitlement. 247 The harm to the value derived from commun-
243Id. at 450. 
244Id. at 448. 
245Id. at 450. 
246 A strong assumption that underlies this Article is that the most basic function of the law 
is to protect the powerless from the structures of power that inevitably arise in any organized 
society. In the sense used in the text, civilization, as contrasted with a state of non-civilization, 
is a circumstance in which things ought to happen on a basis other than might makes right. 
247 See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text (market price will not capture all of this 
value). 
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ality accrues to the extent that Neighbors move away, eroding the 
fabric of community. 
The analysis in the cases overlooks this risk because of express 
judicial impatience with the basis of the risk-as the Supreme Court 
put it, "irrational prejudice. "248 The problem is that the courts have 
treated non-rationality as something pejorative and impermissible, 
irrationality. Yet, it is a simple fact that the presence of pathology 
causes psychic harm. It is a psychic harm of exactly the same nature 
as a psychic harm already recognized by nuisance law, the funeral 
home. 249 And the neighbors of facilities that house pathology bear 
the immediate brunt of that harm. 
Moreover, consider the problem of property devaluation through 
the concept of sociality. An undercurrent in the judicial opinions is 
that the Neighbors suffer harm only because of their perceptions of 
the halfway house residents, perceptions that cannot be given weight 
because they cast fellow citizens in a pejorative light. That is, the 
devaluation is the fault of the complaining Neighbors themselves. 
To cast the blame in that way, however, misunderstands the prob-
lem. For the Neighbors to claim that their property has been dimin-
ished in value is to claim, at least in part, that there has been a drop 
in fair market value. That is, the heart of their claim, and the fact 
that they would have to demonstrate were they to advance a claim 
for damages, is that they can no longer sell their property for the 
pre-LULU price that it commanded. The drop in potential selling 
price, however, does not come from the Neighbors asking for less. 
It comes from the rest of society offering less. In reality, the per-
ceptions that devalue the Neighbors' property are not those of the 
Neighbors, but those of the society generally. 
The cases reveal that the normal judicial analysis is substantially 
incomplete in terms of individuality and sociality. Now consider 
communality. Assume that a halfway house for, say, the mentally 
handicapped is to be located in a residential area that constitutes a 
cohesive local community. To say that there is a community is to 
say, principally, that there is a strong homogeneity of values-shared 
collective representations and moral sentiments. 25o If the Neighbors 
cry "NIMBY!," it is both unwarranted and pejorative to presume 
that this reaction proceeds from prejudicial motives that must not 
be honored because they clash with the political and social values of 
24" City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985). 
249 See supra note 129. 
250 A. HUNTER, supra note 193, at 4. 
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the larger society. If the neighborhood is a community, then the 
sudden introduction of a substantial number of strangers will nec-
essarily disrupt that cohesion of values. 
If the concept of communality is to have equal status with individ-
uality and sociality, then the opposite presumption is necessary, that 
the NIMBY reaction is in a particular sense benign.251 That is, it 
must be presumed that Neighbors are not saying to these outsiders, 
"We don't want you here because of who you are." Rather, they are 
saying, "We don't want you here because of who you are not. And 
you are not the same as us. "252 Both the root concept of the right to 
associate and the essence of according status to communality mean 
that the Neighbors have a right to be who they are. Because they 
realize who they are through their community, that realization is at 
risk if society thrusts outsiders into their midst. 
To the extent that community is disrupted, there is a threefold 
loss. The Neighbors lose as individuals to the extent that their 
community defines and sustains them. Society loses as well to the 
extent that the community enables its members to achieve more 
effective participation in the ongoing processes of society. These 
losses are derivative. In addition, if communality is accepted as a 
coequal mode of existence with individuality and sociality, then there 
is as well a loss of the intrinsic value of community. 
251 The argument here is not that all neighborhood reaction to outsiders is in fact benign in 
the sense described in the text. Much of that reaction indeed does proceed from strongly 
improper motives. The presumption for which the text argues functions in much the same 
way as the holding in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), which is that zoning actions that have the effect of racial exclusion 
mayor may not arise from an impermissible intent to engage in racial discrimination. The 
judiciary will not intervene, however, unless that intent is evident. 
252 The distinction being advanced is the rather slippery one between discriminating against 
(bad) and discriminating in favor of (good). Take, for example, an ethnic neighborhood, say, 
Italian. The residents will not want a Lithuanian family to move in, not because the Italian 
residents consider the ethnic and cultural characteristics of the Lithuanians to be bad, but 
because the Lithuanians are not Italian. It is not a matter of goodness or superiorness 
('Italianness') being distinguished from badness or inferiorness ('Lithuanianness'); rather, it is 
a matter of sameness being distinguished from differentness. Community, by definition, is 
sameness. See R. SENNETT, supra note 193, at 38-40. Taking communality seriously means 
taking the possibility of this distinction seriously. This is all a paradox because exclusionary 
attitudes can arise from "bad" discrimination as well and because it is not ultimately possible 
to tell whether good or bad discrimination is involved in any particular case. The root of the 
paradox is that individuality, sociality, and communality are incommensurable. Introducing 
the third mode of existence simply increases the occurrence of clashes in which something 
valued in one mode or another must give way. Or, to put it yet one more way, dilemmas arise 
as a consequence of understanding that our world is complex rather than simple. Once more, 
the author of this Article is a fox, not a hedgehog. 
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B. The Tension Between Heritage and Heresy 
One of the basic tensions that a society must balance is that 
between heritage and heresy. The risk acceptors will always be 
pressing for change, lest stagnation stultify its creative energies and 
economic and cultural decline set in. The risk averse, by contrast, 
will press for stability lest incessant change cause society to degen-
erate into chaos, destroying the possibility of the cohesion of values 
that lies at the heart of social viability. 253 
We are in the latter stages of the liberal project. In our particular 
society, we have tried to achieve this through a system of liberties 
and a preference for equality of opportunity over equality of result. 
These two principles give to each member of society the greatest 
possible control over individual destiny. 
The philosopher John Rawls sought to describe the political struc-
ture that we would, in ideal circumstances, choose. 254 Whether he 
succeeded in doing that or not, it is clear that, with the system that 
he did describe,255 he succeeded in capturing the essence of our actual 
political structure. The structure that Rawls describes gives great 
weight to substantial equality of wealth and power. Nevertheless, it 
also has built into it a preference for disparities of wealth and power 
that will lead not only to a greater level of overall societal wealth 
but also to a greater level of wealth for the most disadvantaged. 256 
Most of us most of the time are risk averse. Despite the propor-
tionately small numbers of risk acceptors, it is a further genius of 
our system that we have been able to institutionalize a considerable 
bias toward heresy. In our public choice process, it turns out in 
practice that it takes resources to participate.257 Since there also is 
253 There is a growing literature arguing that this tension has shifted dangerously far in the 
direction of heritage, with our well documented economic decline caused by growing economic 
inflexibility. See supra note 141. 
254 J. RAWLS, supra note 143. 
255 I d. at 302-03. 
256 See id. at 303. "All social primary goods-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, 
and the bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of 
any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored." I d. This difference principle 
sees a form of real-world application in the continuing political choice of economic growth 
enlarging the absolute size of each citizen's share of the wealth pie over redistributing wealth 
in the direction of equalizing the relative size of the slices. See J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT 
SOCIETY 78-97 (1958). 
257 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. Note that, of the three categories of those 
with the realistic possibility of participating in the public choice process (government, bu-
reaucrats, and producers), two are risk acceptors. 
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a tendency for the more affluent to be risk acceptors,258 then the 
outcome of the public choice process will shade toward the heretical. 
The law of harms tracks the biases of our political order closely. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. captured the bias: 
A man need not, it is true, do this or that act,-the term act 
implies a choice,-but he must act somehow. Furthermore, the 
public generally profits by individual activity. As action cannot 
be avoided, and tends to the public good, there is obviously no 
policy in throwing the hazard of what is at once desirable and 
inevitable upon the actor. 259 
In Holmes's day, and well into our own, the entire apparatus of 
the tort law has worked to insulate the risk taker. Rather than 
holding him strictly liable for the consequences of his actions, the 
elaborate structure of standards of care, causation, foreseeability, 
and assumption of risk have socialized risk taking. For instance, as 
Learned Hand established in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. ,260 
the standard of care is measured not by what the reasonable average 
person would do but by what the reasonable entrepreneur would do. 
lt is easy to argue that the more recent deep pocket approach to 
tort compensation is merely a veneer over this basic structure. We 
will continue to reward the risk taker. When, however, he becomes 
successful, that is, when his pocket becomes deep, he must share 
his gains with those he harms. 
Though the law of nuisance lagged behind, it has shed its strict 
liability trappings. As Donner-Hanna261 indicates, whether the harm 
that the entrepreneur throws onto the neighbor rises to the level of 
a compensable event depends in important part on whether the 
harm-causing activity was reasonable. As in tort generally, the rea-
sonableness of one who causes a repeated harmful invasion of his 
neighbor is measured self-reflexively-is he harming his neighbors 
just like his fellow entrepreneurs would? 
Indeed, this bias is built into our constitutional system. The taking 
clauses of our various constitutions embody the bargain. Society, 
through its paramount power to reallocate even land that remains 
in private hands to other uses, serves heresy. Heritage is served by 
the requirement that the dispossessed be left in no worse an eco-
258 This is not to say that all risk acceptors are more affluent. Many of them take their risks 
and fail. Rather, the focus is on the successful risk acceptors. 
259 O. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 77 (1963). 
2fiO United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
261 See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. 
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nomic position, with the promise that the reallocation will benefit 
every member of society. The criticism throughout this Article has 
not been with the implicit balance that has been struck between 
heritage and heresy. The criticism is that we have not lived up to 
its terms. 
v. SOLUTIONS 
This Article has argued that the L UL U Neighbor finds herself 
whipsawed by the public choice and remedial processes that are 
nominally open to her. Because producers, political entrepreneurs, 
and bureaucrats dominate the public choice process, Neighbor has 
little chance of bringing her views to bear unless she has the oppor-
tunity, and makes the substantial investment of time, money, and 
emotion, to form a collective action group. 
Even if she is successful in the public choice process, however, 
she faces a judicial challenge by the L UL U Owner. Especially if the 
LULU will serve the disadvantaged, Neighbor will see her initial 
victory judicially reversed. Worse, in justifying the reversal as a 
means of more properly achieving the public interest, the opinion 
might thereby not too subtly suggest that, by her opposition, she 
has failed to be a good citizen. 
If Neighbor turns to the judicial process for compensation for the 
harm that the L UL U will cause her, she is not likely to emerge with 
anything approaching satisfaction. The compensation that she re-
ceives will be based on a narrow view of what counts as a legally 
cognizable harm. Because much of her claims for compensation will 
be based on losses that can only be expressed subjectively, it is not 
likely that the level of her award will approach a level that is com-
pensatory on her scale of values. Worse, whatever award she might 
receive will come at a substantial discount. 
Perhaps worst of all, she will emerge from her experiences with 
an all too sophisticated understanding of "the way things work" and 
of the full impact of those workings on her life and fortune. She will 
have been caught up in the process through which society selects 
and pursues its goals. She will be left, however, with more than a 
suspicion that society seeks to achieve these goals on the cheap. 
A. Tinkering 
The discussion to this point has amounted to an extended treat-
ment of the theme, "Ain't it awful?" Despite this criticism of the 
public choice and remedial systems as they are now working, there 
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seems to be little potential for improvement. We have experienced 
nearly a generation of increasing citizen activism at all levels of 
government. Because participatory power depends so strongly on 
the command of material resources, it is likely that further substan-
tial improvement in the breadth of participation can come only 
through a likewise substantial redistribution of wealth. The political 
prospects for that would seem to be quite poor. The preference for 
equality of opportunity over equality of distribution is strongly 
embedded in our political values. 262 Moreover, there is a problem of 
circularity. To increase the political demand for greater wealth re-
distribution toward equality would require greater participation of 
the less well off in the system. 
Similarly, there seems to be little promise for improving the func-
tioning of the current compensation system. It is true, of course, 
that the entrepreneurial bias in our remedial law is a matter of 
judicial choice. However embedded that choice might be, it is always 
subject to judicial change. What remains daunting, however, is the 
intractability of the factual questions surrounding the valuation of 
communal and subjective harm. 
B. The Neighborhood District 
The quarrel is not with the heretical nature of the decisions by 
which L UL Us come into existence. Rather, it is with the failure of 
the system to socialize the cost of these socialized allocational 
choices. These costs are now falling in quite particular patterns. 
Because of the nature of land costs, less affluent areas, all other 
things being equal, are more attractive candidates for L UL U sites 
than more affluent areas. Thus, the less affluent tend to be the 
victims of L UL U s. In addition, community is a more likely phenom-
enon in a less affluent area simply because the values that commu-
nities provide are more desirable at lower levels of affluence. 263 
Wealth is a strong substitute for these values. 264 Thus, the victims 
of L UL U s are as often members of cohesive communities as they 
are atomistic, powerless individuals. 
If the problem is the adverse distributional consequences that 
result from the establishment of LULUs, then the solution ought to 
262 See supra note 16. 
263 See R. SENNETT, supra note 193, at 52-53. 
264 Indeed, affluence seems to allow what has been called a "myth of purified community," 
an abstract image of community solidarity that not only belies an atomized experience but 
also functions to allow people not to interact in a communal way. Id. at 30-49. 
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have two purposes. The immediate purpose would be to provide an 
accessible and effective vehicle for individual Neighbors to form a 
collective action group. The nature of this immediate purpose is 
empowerment, to provide the Neighbors an effective means to 
achieve recompense that the workings of the public choice and ju-
dicial processes now deny them. The ultimate purpose would be to 
compensate the Neighbors entirely on their terms, however subjec-
tive this might be. This ultimate purpose would be entirely remedial. 
It would proceed on, and fulfill, the implicit bargain of the takings 
clause. The public choice process makes the allocation decision; those 
who are expropriated receive just compensation. 
1. The Concept 
A model for such a mechanism to achieve these two purposes is 
readily available, that is, the special district. 265 The special district 
is extensively used as a vehicle for undertaking a wide variety of 
local improvements, from flood controJ266 to water supply,267 from 
agricultural land drainage268 to schools and fire protection.269 When 
it is used for these purposes, the special district functions as a 
collective action group to overcome barriers to providing public 
goods. 270 Adapted for the NIMBY problem, the concept might be 
265 The special district is a mechanism to organize the capture of a benefit with significant, 
but local, public goods aspects, taxing the cost proportionately to all properties benefited. It 
has found wide use because it is an effective device for avoiding state constitutional and 
statutory limitations on the debt level and taxing power of local government. See 4 c. SANDS 
& M. LIBONATI, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 24.20 (1982). Something of this neighborhood 
district approach has found use in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area in the wake of the 
construction of a regional rail mass transit system. In low-density residential areas around 
new stations, for which the market creates strong pressure for more intensive residential and 
commercial uses, residents have attempted to form consortia to allow them to deal with 
developers as a group in order to maximize their share of the increase in land values associated 
with this market pressure. For an example, see Washington Post, Sept. 8, 1986, at D1, col. 
4. 
266 E.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 8110-8165 (West 1971) (flood control); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-104a (West 1975) (soil and water conservation); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-21.112 (1983 
& Supp. 1987) (soil conservation). 
267 E.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 20,500-29,975 (West 1984) (irrigation); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 357A.1-357A.20 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987) (rural water supply); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. 
§§ 58.011-58.836 (Vernon 1988) (irrigation). 
268 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 42, §§ 1-1-12-24 (Smith-Hurd 1976 & Supp. 1987-88) (drainage); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.01-111.82 (West 1987) (drainage and flood control). 
269 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 36-8-11-1-36-8-11-21 (Burns 1981 & Supp. 1987) (fire protec-
tion); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-112.22-21-140.3 (1983 & Supp. 1987) (sanitation). 
270 Government intervenes into the price decision in this way--{)n the advice of Government, 
LULU Developer enters into a contract with the Neighborhood District for the price that 
Government is willing to pay. Government then condemns LULU Developer's position in the 
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reborn as the "neighborhood district." It would function as a collec-
tive action group to provide a barrier to wealth transfers. 
Several relatively simple ground rules would govern the function-
ing of the district. There would be a prohibition on the district from 
participating in any administrative or judicial proceeding in order to 
oppose the L UL U. The district could prevent the establishment of 
the L UL U only if its demands for compensation are unmet. 271 Both 
the decision to form the district and all internal decisions would be 
made by a supermajority voting rule. 272 Such a rule would prevent 
one or a few holdouts from frustrating the formation of the district 
or blocking its internal decisions. 273 
In order to insure that the members receive compensation on their 
terms, the property within the district would be protected by a 
Property Rule. 274 It would be immune from the eminent domain 
power of government. It also would be protected from the effective 
expropriation that would result were its property protected from 
nuisance only by a damages rule. Rather, it would be accorded an 
injunction against any L UL U that might affect the value of its 
constituent properties. 
contract. The generous attitude of Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), allowing takings 
that will serve the public benefit although they will not be for a public use, makes this feasible. 
271 The concept would be similar to the supermajority voting rules required for major 
decisions for condominiums, those affecting how the entity is constituted. E.g., FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 718.110(1)(a) (West 1988) (two-thirds); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 327(a) (Smith-Hurd 
1987) (two-thirds); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183A, §§ 5(b) (unanimity), 17(b) (three-
quarters), 18(b) (three-quarters) (West 1977); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.50(190)(2) (Callaghan 
1984) (two-thirds). 
272 A question involving considerable difficulty is the geographical extent of the district. 
Were the boundaries to be drawn too inclusively, an individual located too remotely to feel 
any physical effects from the L UL U and in a neighborhood without any communality values 
could coat-tail and receive compensation without having been harmed. One solution might be 
a two-level approach to boundaries. On the first level would be only those parcels abutting 
the L UL U or within sight or reach of its external effects and all those parcels abutting such 
parcels. On the second level would be those parcels that would be included were a community 
to exist-either those parcels within an identified neighborhood with natural boundaries or 
those parcels within a sociological definition of community, for example, the six criteria set 
out in A. DOWNS, supra note 193, at 14. If the Neighbors defined a district with an extent 
beyond the first level, they would be protected by a presumption that communality exists 
over this range. Government, the LULU owner, or dissenting Neighbors, however, would 
have standing to rebut this presumption. 
273 The principal internal decision would be the determination of the amount and distribution 
of the compensation payment. This is, of course, no small decision. If the voting rule does not 
set a high enough level, there could be considerable oppression of minorities. If it is set too 
high, the decisional process could become paralyzed. There should be a mechanism to prevent 
decisional paralysis from frustrating the LULU developer. Whether the problem of internal 
decisionmaking can be worked out will determine the practical viability of the Neighborhood 
District concept. 
274 For a definition of "Property Rule," see Calabresi and Melamed at supra note 117. 
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Finally, the district would be empowered to demand compensation 
from a L UL U in any form, provided only that the L UL U is a single 
facility likely to produce external effects.275 This would include the 
entrepreneurial LULU, such as the toxic waste treatment facility 
with its physical and aesthetic externalities. It would also include 
the social service L UL U, such as the halfway house with its psychic 
externalities. 276 
2. The Justification 
The Neighborhood District would clearly have a considerable im-
pact on the Neighbors in terms of the modes of existence of com-
munality and individuality. If the Neighbors are located in a cohesive 
community, the district mechanism will function to monetarize the 
derivative value of that community to the Neighbors. Unless, how-
ever, the compensation is not forthcoming, the district can operate 
as a limitation on the community to the extent that it will prevent 
the exercise of whatever power the community may theretofore have 
had to block the L UL U through the political process. 
The bulwark function of the Neighborhood District is most evident 
in the case of the atomistic individual. In a mass society, most people 
fall into that mode. Because most people are risk averse, most are 
not entrepreneurs. Because of the circumstances of mass society, or 
perhaps because of choice,277 most people do not find themselves in 
a cohesive community. The structure of our political system works 
from there to render the atomistic individual powerless-our system 
of individual liberties and our pluralistic, participatory democratic 
process engender the consequence that who we are is what we do. 
A further consequence is that the political acceptance of risk entails 
the shielding of the risk takers from the side effects of their actions. 
Since, however, not everyone can be empowered, the system in 
practice disenfranchises a large core of people. The Neighborhood 
275 The basic idea is strongly analogous to the point source concept, as contrasted with the 
non-point source concept, of pollution under the Federal Clean Water Act. See respectively, 
33 U.S.C. § 1311(e) (1982); id., § 1314(0. 
276 As there is with the problem of what territory can be included in the Neighborhood 
District, there is a significant problem in defining what constitutes a LULU against which 
the District is to be allowed to organize. Illustrative of the problem is the "people pollution" 
specter raised in Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). A facility or a 
complex of facilities, such as a public housing project with its class and density externalities, 
would seem to satisfy the "point source" concept of LULU. A pattern of zoning changes and 
public subsidies designed to increase the development of housing for income classes far lower 
than the norm in a particular suburb perhaps ought not to satisfy the concept. 
277 The choice, of course, is a function of the operation of our national myth of rugged 
individualism. 
502 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:437 
District provides a ready made ad hoc community,278 a mechanism 
for overcoming the substantial transaction costs that the individual 
must otherwise face in organizing to avoid the wealth loss generated 
by the expropriative LULU.279 
The ramifications of the Neighborhood District for society are 
equally significant. The notion of nuisance on which this concept is 
based is considerably expanded. It necessarily includes the aesthetic 
component of the impact of an entrepreneurial L UL U as well as the 
psychic impact of a social service L UL U. It necessarily erodes the 
notion of sovereign immunity which government in many jurisdic-
tions, including the federal, enjoys. It necessarily expands the range 
of compensation. 
The concept, however, tends to leave intact the current power of 
entrepreneurs, working through the public choice process, to domi-
nate the selection of allocational choices. Further, the Neighborhood 
District would function to remove transaction costs from the process 
of establishing L UL Us. As a result, the concept uses compensation, 
rather than a damping of the operation of the allocational market, 
as the preferred mechanism for accounting for the disruptive effects 
of market choices. 280 
Finally, by giving LULU Neighbors a bulwark, the Neighborhood 
District concept works to embed the notion of communality as a way 
of effectuating constitutional principles. On the one hand, to the 
extent that it forces, for a price, communities to accept the presence 
of those who are different, the concept can operate to generate a 
bribe to Neighbors to do what our societal values say they should 
do anyway. On the other hand, the concept works to undermine the 
present state of affairs, a systematic and pernicious transfer from 
the poor to the rich, all with the pious blessing of a process of societal 
choice manipulated by the affluent. 
278 Anthony Downs calls this the "community of limited liability." A. DOWNS, supra note 
193, at 14. 
279 The function of the Neighborhood District is not to empower the atomistic individual in 
the public choice process so that he now has a measure of influence over the substance of the 
LULU siting decision. Rather, the function is instead to provide a shield against the wealth 
distributional consequences of siting the LULU. Contrast the empowerment approach in 
Michelman, Property As a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1112 (1981) 
(the core of the principle of strong constitutional protection for individual rights in property 
is to prevent expropriations of that property which functions as "an essential component of 
individual competence in social and political life"). 
280 To the extent that the Neighborhood District concept expands the amount of compen-
sation that Neighbors otherwise might have received, it tends also to shift from the LULU 
entrepreneur's hands the considerable gain in market-measurable value that typically accom-
panies the conversion of land to more intensive uses. 
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VI. REPRISE 
In recent decades, we have moved, however imperfectly, toward 
protecting the crucial ingredients of the natural biotic systems that 
have survived the depredations of humankind. So far, however, we 
have failed to understand the wise observation of Lewis Thomas-
"We are now the dominant feature of our own environment."281 This 
failure translates into an insensitivity to the analogous subsystems 
of our human environment. Until we accommodate these subsys-
tems, our efforts to establish and carry out sensitive land uses will 
continue to be marked by political gridlock, citizen demoralization, 
and the continued ruin of our natural and social systems. 
281 L. THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL 105 (1974). 
